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ASPECTS OF THE STUDY OF SOCIETY

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Preface

THIS little book consists of summaries of weekly talks to groups of miners and school-teachers in a number of towns and villages in South Wales during the winter of 1922-23. The course at each centre included, in addition to those summarised in the following chapters, discussions of such subjects as Eugenics, Crime, Education, Religion, Democracy, Trusts and Combines, Socialism, Communism, the Modern City, and of other problems in Applied Sociology, but lack of space made their inclusion in this volume impossible.

No attempt was made to reach a final solution of any particular problem. The immediate task set was to demonstrate that social problems are amenable to scientific treatment and to inculcate a philosophical attitude of


mind towards them. In the present stage of sociological enquiry this is as far as we can go with confidence. If the publication of these brief introductory studies helps in the smallest measure to foster a feeling that there is no easy short-cut to Utopia, and a conviction that the problems of society cannot be solved by frequent repetition of cant phrases and fascinating formulæ, their author's purpose will be achieved.

R. T. EVANS.

July 21, 1923.

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Chapter I The Scope and Method of Sociology

BEFORE we can profitably study any science it is necessary that we should know the kind of facts with which it deals, for so long as the object to be studied by a science remains vague that science cannot be expected to attain clearness and accuracy. This is especially necessary in the case of Sociology, for its acceptance as a science is not yet universal, nor are the limits of its subject-matter definitely drawn.

To Spencer it was the study of the origin and development of social institutions; Letourneau regarded it as the study of social beginnings, thereby making it overlap the provinces of Ethnology and Anthropology; in the hands of Dr. Lester F. Ward it is made to take for its subject-matter the whole of human achievement, seeking to show how languages, sciences, and arts came into being and how the structure of civilisation is being or has been erected; while Professor Giddings makes it equivalent to a science of associa-

tion. Not infrequently to-day we find the term applied indifferently to any piece of social investigation with an ameliorative or regenerative object, and consequently it becomes increasingly necessary to define the scope of the science, if such it be, and to determine its relation to the other acknowledged sciences.

The chief founder of the science treating of social phenomena was Comte, and for it he coined the unfortunate name of *Sociologie*. With Mathematics as its base, Comte constructed an ascending scale of sciences, their sequence being indicative of the order of evolution and determined on the principle of increasing complexity and decreasing generality, each science resting on the conclusions of the sciences which preceded it. The crowning science of the hierarchy, the one to which all that had gone before led, was that which dealt with the phenomena of human society—Sociology.

The new science made no great progress for some time, which can be partly accounted for by two reasons. The first is that much of the subject-matter had already been pre-

empted by several special independent social sciences. The various groups of relations which bind men together in society—the economic, political, legal, moral, and others—had become respectively the provinces of Economics, Politics, Jurisprudence, and Ethics. The second reason is that the early Sociology sought to find governing social phenomena laws as mechanical and inexorable as those governing the movements of the heavenly bodies; its analogies, in the case of its founder, being largely drawn from Physics and Astronomy. Later, with the rise of biological science, we can trace a change in its terminology, but to Spencer, who began to write on social science before the rise of Darwinism, Sociology remained mechanical in all but its analogies. The spread of the conception of organic evolution and the application to the study of social development of the ideas of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest led to the view of society as an organic structure.

In “The Man versus the State,” Spencer protests against the prevailing error “that society is a manufacture, whereas it is a

growth," and that consequently governments should leave it alone so that the operative biological laws should have freedom to work out their inevitably beneficent results. "As I heard remarked by a distinguished professor, whose studies give ample means of judging, 'When once you begin to interfere with the order of Nature, there is no knowing where the results will end.' And if this is true of that sub-human order of Nature to which he referred, still more is it true of that order of Nature existing in the social arrangements produced by aggregated human beings" (p. 64).

The conception of society as analogous to a biological organism is helpful so long as it is not applied too rigidly, as was done by Spencer. Its rigid application leads to all sorts of difficulties, as does the older conception of society as being merely an artificial compound.

These can only be avoided by a recognition of the part played by intelligent human effort in the shaping of social life. This corrective came with the rise of Psychology, which exerted a profound influence upon Sociology,

an influence that is still at work. It became increasingly realised that the search for a single all-explaining formula of social development was futile. Society came to be viewed as the resultant of a plurality of factors, not the least of which was man's own rational endeavour in adjusting himself to his environment and his environment to himself.

The briefest definition of Sociology given is that of Professor Hobhouse, in which he claims it to be "the Science of Society." This has been variously amplified into "the science of the entire series of the fundamental laws which apply to social phenomena," or, again, though with less precision, into "the scientific study of the origin, development, structure, functions and decay of the ideas and institutions of mankind in successive stages of society."*

But, as already pointed out, the subject-matter claimed in these definitions has already been appropriated by a number of social sciences. "The origin, development, structure, functions and decay" of social institu-

* Frederic Harrison, *The Sociological Review*, April, 1910.

tions, for example, have long been claimed by Anthropology and History as part of their legitimate sphere of investigation.

The Comtist, of course, disputes the claim of many of these so-called sciences to the name, and insists that there are only seven or possibly eight master-sciences, of which Sociology is one, and that such specialisms as Anthropology, Archæology, Politics, Economics, Civics, and so forth, are merely its sub-divisions; they are but subsidiary and specialised enquiries into various groups of social phenomena, separated for purposes of convenience and efficiency of method. These, the Comtist would say, are not sciences at all, but merely scientific studies, each with its own province of knowledge and methods of enquiry, but all related each to the other because they are equally tributary to the science which investigates the "fundamental laws of society" as a whole.

Nothing is further from our purpose than to discuss here the classification of the sciences; neither shall we attempt to lay down any rules to determine whether any specialised and organised study dealing with

a clearly defined group of facts is entitled to be called a science. It is, however, necessary that we should have some general idea of the manner in which the whole known universe has been divided up between the intellectual settlers.

Now it is obvious when we survey the whole range of human knowledge that the facts group themselves into certain well-defined categories. We have, for example, the facts relating to the inorganic, and those relating to the organic world. We at once arrive at the most obvious—and, with our existing knowledge, the fundamental division—and perhaps the most convenient classification of our knowledge would be under the heads of the Science of Matter and the Science of Life; though, between these even, no clear line of demarcation can be definitely drawn, for living and non-living things are made of the same matter, the energy by virtue of which they work is the same, and there is no sufficient reason to doubt but that life arose from a peculiar and very complex arrangement of certain elements of non-living matter. However, for the purposes of the specialisa-

tion necessary to thorough investigation, sub-division is indispensable; and further, the inorganic world in its turn must be subdivided, and each sub-division must become the province of a separate study, and so we have Chemistry and Physics, each again with its own subject studies. Likewise with the organic world, Biology, or the Science of Life, has separated itself into specialisms. Botany deals with the phenomena of plant life; Zoology investigates animal life, and Psychology seeks to understand that outstanding manifestation of life—Mind. Of each of these, again, there are sub-divisions.

Anthropology, for example, specialises in the study of the evolution of one and the chief animal, Man; Economics treat of him in relation to the satisfaction of his wants; Politics directs its attention to investigating the way in which he has organised the government of his communities, and so we find the sciences branching off into a multitude of specialisms, all running into and helping each other.

If we look at a map of, say, England and Wales, we shall find that the original was

probably drawn and painted by one man, but to enable us to view this representation of England and Wales as a whole has involved hundreds of local surveys, the carrying out of which was impossible by any one individual.

The accuracy of our map depends on the accuracy with which the details of each local survey have been recorded. Each of these surveys, undertaken by men of special skill and experience, has been reproduced in a sheet, and here we will find details of footpaths, level crossings, embankments and cuttings, parish boundaries, churches with spires, and churches without spires, which, while of the utmost value to the local topographer, do not—indeed they cannot—appear in our wall-map, nor is it necessary that they should.

Thus it is with that single all-embracing Science which has for its aim the complete and systematic interpretation of Reality. As yet this Science is only in the making, but the surveyors with their specialist knowledge and equipment are at work in their districts. True, they sometimes spend their time describing too minutely oddities which are

interesting but not of the highest importance; sometimes they quarrel with those working on a neighbouring area about the exact position of their respective frontiers; nevertheless, they are providing the material which will enable someone some day to provide a comprehensive account of Reality. The passion for a full understanding of himself and his world from which Science sprang, and to satisfy which it exists, will make Man dissatisfied with less. The settlement of the disputes concerning the fixing of the border lines of the numerous sciences is insignificant compared with the need for that co-ordination of effort and the correlation of data which is so important for the building up of a single comprehensive and coherent body of truth.

Now, the method whereby this ultimate Science of Reality can alone be made possible is equally helpful in the case of each of the specialisms into which it is at present divided; they, too, must be further broken up into subject studies.

Sociology, making the whole life of society its special concern, is part of the study of

Man, for which some such name as "Andrology"* has been suggested. The specialism which has titular authority to extend its investigations to cover the whole subject of Man is Anthropology, but in practice its interest is mainly restricted to the study of existing primitive races. If, in the future, Anthropology should establish its claim to the whole province from which it has taken its title, then Sociology would have to be considered as one of its sub-sections, as would History and all those studies which concern themselves with any phase of human life. At present, however, Sociology can claim it as a sister-study, from which it can borrow all the discoveries and conclusions which are relevant to its particular purpose.

What Sociology aims at is the application of scientific method to all the phenomena relating to Man as a social animal with a view to a complete comprehension of the causes and conditions of all forms of social change. Its first task, therefore, must be

* Crawford, "Man and his Past," p. 58. This name, however, would not be good; it suggests man as opposed to woman.

the accumulation of significant facts; then it must endeavour to see these facts in relation to one another and elicit any general laws which govern them. It is clear then that Sociology is one of the methods of correlating the separate groups of facts and conclusions gathered by investigators in their separate fields of study. In other words, it is a synthetic science focussing several sciences in its study of human society.

For his particular purpose the sociologist wishes to know the general laws which have shaped the intellectual, social and moral evolution of mankind. He wishes to see his subject—Man—in settings other than those in which he ordinarily finds him to-day, and so he betakes himself to the archæologist, who, it must be remembered, is something more than an individual with a harmless mania for collecting curios. Working with his spade he unearths Man's earliest tools, his pots and sherds, his weapons and earth-works, and from them makes deductions, because they are the handiwork of Man and through them he can reach back to the mind

that designed them and directed the fingers that shaped them.

The archæologist goes a long way towards reconstructing for us the past by showing us Man's increasingly successful efforts to provide himself with the means of conquering his environment, and of rebuilding for us the homes and settlements of primitive men, thus enabling us to deduce the extent of the social horizon and the probable basis and character of early society.

Then, the many gaps in the story can be filled up by the anthropologist, who can tell us something of the psychology and habits of peoples who are to-day, or were until recently, in stages of development corresponding in many respects to those through which the civilised races have undoubtedly passed in their upward journey. He can provide the sociologist with invaluable data by exploring the causes of the arrest of development or their decay in these races. Was there present some inherent incapacity in these races to master their environment? If so, to what was this incapacity due? Was it the absence of any recurrent infusion of

new blood, or the lack of a vitalising contact with peoples bringing with them new habits, customs, and ideas ?

And further, the anthropologist can tell us of the forces which bind these beings together in society as well as the comparative strength of these forces. He can show us in the process of being made, the social institutions with which we are acquainted in a developed form. He can show us the part played by kinship, superstition, conquest, and so forth, in shaping and moulding a social structure, and the organisation of Government, for "the continuity of human development has been such that most, if not all, of the great institutions which still form the framework of civilised life have their roots in savagery, and have been handed down to us in these later days through countless generations, assuming new outward form in the process of transmission, but remaining in their inmost core substantially unchanged."*

The anthropologist, in the light of his knowledge of primitive races, alone can explain to us the significance of so many of

* Frazer, "History of Kingship," p. 3.

those survivals which have persisted until to-day in clogging the wheels of progress. In short, the joint contribution of Archæology and Anthropology is to Sociology what, in the study of animal life, Embryology is to Morphology (the study of structure) and Physiology (the study of activities or functions).

The adult organism has not always been what it now is, for, however complex its matured organisation may be, it has had a simple beginning and has passed through a complicated series of developmental changes in order to become a highly complex organisation.

The study of these structural changes up to the period of birth is known as Embryology, and this is the function of Archæology and Anthropology in the study of society; with great profit to each other and as an aid to general comprehension they can be correlated to serve in the capacity of Social Embryology. They constitute the study of society in the making, up to the stage at which comes the turn of the historian. The historian carries on the story from the point where a greater measure of certainty is possible on account of the existence of written documents. True, History,

along with the other studies, aims at explaining how communities have come to be what they are, and looks backward in order to understand the present; where it differs from Anthropology is in the volume and character of the evidence on which it can work. The very bulk of its materials is perhaps a hindrance, and Sociology can render a real service by compelling a sifting of the facts which are significant and relevant to its main purpose from those which are in a great measure valueless.

Moreover, our sociologist knows no narrow spirit of national patriotism in his quest of the fundamental laws of social change. He has interest in the great men of the nations only to the extent to which they illustrate the way in which the life of the individual has been shaped and moulded by the character of the society of which he is a member. He is concerned with the great civilisations of antiquity only in so far as they provide material for discerning those unmistakable elements of strength in political societies, the presence of which promotes growth and well-being, and the absence or loss of which entails stagnation and decay; and he is thus able

to extract some general conclusions applicable to the whole of humanity.

He is anxious to learn not of royal amours or court intrigues, nor of how battles and wars were won and lost, but of how ideas and theories have arisen, and of the influence they have exercised; of the causes and conditions of economic changes and their reactions on the political, legal and social institutions of society, and on the thought and morality of the mass of the people. In a word, the sociologist wishes to know from the studies concerned with the things which have happened how mankind has arrived at this point in its journey; what impelled it to start and persist in its progress; what factors influenced the course of the march; what obstacles it met, and how it overcame them; what ingenuities of organisation enabled it to arrive at its present stage; why some of those who began the trek fell by the wayside and others tarried far down the trail. In his enquiry he will turn to the geographer to ascertain the nature and extent of the influence over human communities of what is called "geographic control"; in other words, he wishes to know

the relation of the form and structure of society to the climate, food, soil, and the physical conformation of the country in which that society grew up.

About the middle of the nineteenth century there developed a school of thought of which Buckle in England, Le Play in France, and Ratzel in Germany, have been the chief exponents which gave to those factors a dominant potency not previously attributed to them. And while it is important to guard against underestimating the significance of the differential qualities of the peoples in determining the mode of reaction to environing conditions, it is clear that the infinite variety of peoples with their varying institutions and their cultural peculiarities must be due to some decisive causes; and that the similarity in many of the ideas, habits, and social structures of people who had been cradled and had grown up under similar material circumstances demonstrated a close connection between social types and geographical environment. To the least expert geographer it is obvious that before any extensive commerce had been developed, climate had

determined what men's food should be and whether or not they needed to work hard for a livelihood, that the physical features of the earth, sea, mountains, etc., had gone far to fix their occupations and to decide the extent and nature of the intercourse which they could have with their neighbours, that men's ideas and beliefs were coloured and in a measure suggested by their natural surroundings.

It does not require great geographical insight to see how the rich plains of the Euphrates and the Nile encouraged large masses of men to dwell there, nor how, apart from the comparative ease with which human wants were supplied in the river valleys of warm lands, the physical fact of a considerable area sheltered from outside interference and easily traversed by water or land rendered such basins the natural seats of the early despotic civilisations. Neither is it difficult to realise how the conformation of their country affected the development of the political life of the Greeks. When we know that their land is divided up into a large number of isolated districts we can under-

stand why there never was a single united Greek state, but rather a number of little republican states such as those of Athens, Sparta, Thebes, etc., no larger than an English county, but always passionately independent.

It is easy, of course, to overestimate the force of geographical factors, and it will readily be conceded that with men's attainment of greater control over their environment the influence of these factors has been greatly diminished, but Man's independence of them is still far from complete. Doubtless social evolution is the result of a multitude of forces, and certainly we shall never know all the factors which operated in producing the original variation into racial types, but it is important for the sociologist in his quest for a complete understanding of social phenomena to know whether it is possible to observe any uniform correspondence between the specific characters of the physical environment with which Man has done battle and definite types of social organisations. The interest of the sociologist in the interactions of Man and his environment, however, does not cease when he has exhausted the con-

tributions of the anthropo-geographer, for the latter deals only with mass effects. He comes up against the problem again when he turns his attention to the study of human behaviour in society.

As we have already pointed out, the rise of Psychology exerted a profound influence upon Sociology. The history of the attempts to explain political society is largely the story of a failure to understand what are called the "laws of human nature." One school maintained that the power which binds men together as members of a state is physical force acting upon them through fear of pain or death; another conceived it to lie in a rational view of the common advantage which caused men of their own free will to divest themselves of certain of their supposed original individual rights in order to secure certain common benefits; whilst the Utilitarian School attributed the sole motive of action to a desire for pleasure. Social Psychology has now compelled a realisation that members of a community do not generally act in response to any single impulse. Groups have been found to be more than

mere aggregates of individuals, and social action to be the result of a complex of tendencies and elements, the analysis of which is of first importance in any attempt at comprehending human society. The study of human nature in its social aspects is therefore an integral part of sociological investigation. In this connection the contribution of Biology assumes importance, for in recent years instincts have acquired considerable prominence in accounts of the causation of human behaviour. It is no longer possible to conceive of instinct simply as that which distinguishes the lower animals from men, for it is now known that the basis of human character is constituted by innate instinctive tendencies which are the essential springs and motive powers of many of our actions. With the realisation of the continuity of human with animal evolution not only as regards physical but also mental characteristics the importance of the study of the nature of instinct and the principles of hereditary transmission becomes evident. It is necessary to know whether there are any permanent inherited elements in human

nature which assign limits to capacity for progress, or lay down the lines along which it alone becomes possible. There is no space to pursue this discussion further, though what has already been said is enough to indicate the method of our study. Sociology is essentially a borrowing and synthetic science. Taking as its aim the elucidation of the principles or laws of social change, it gathers its data from a number of special studies; it pieces its facts together in a variety of ways in order to see whether they will make an intelligible picture of an important phase of reality. Its primary function is not social reform, but the discovery of what exists and the explanation of why it exists. Yet the Science of Sociology is of the greatest practical importance, for like other sciences it can serve as a handmaid of the human will. Sociology as the repository of a really scientific knowledge of the social mechanism could set the human mind free from an accumulation of errors, and provide mankind with a knowledge of the means of realising many human purposes.

There is no limit to what men can attempt,

but it is the business of Science to show what can last. Sociology, by knowing the permanent constitution of the mind and the silent forces which determine the success or failure of human effort, can save certain forms of idealism from much of their futile endeavour and direct their energy into channels through which they are more likely to achieve their ends. From the practical standpoint it might be defined as the study of what is socially possible. Could we but introduce into our legislatures the scientific spirit of dispassionate research to replace the endless conflict of group egoisms and class interests there would be some ground for optimism as to the future.

Social reform is to-day about the only sphere of human life where the scientific expert is at a discount. In other directions, once a human purpose has been formulated, a science is at hand with means for its realisation. The various Utopias which men have dreamed of are indications of a profound conviction that a higher order of society is attainable. Instead of the foolish tinkering and patching which exhaust the

efforts of our amateur reformers at present, perhaps Sociology, which is as yet in its infancy and has hardly got beyond the stage of rough empirical generalisation, will some day become adequate for the task of providing the means of attaining a civilisation founded on scientific knowledge and secured by perfect political institutions.

THE study of the evolution of human society from its remotest beginnings is of the first importance to Sociology. The life of Man on earth probably covers many hundreds of thousands of years, and History, in the narrower sense of the word, deals with only a few of the later centuries. It is like studying a book by reading only its final chapter or a play by observing its concluding scene. Modern History is just one scene—and a very short one at that—in the long drama of Man's evolution. Social development is a continuous process reaching back through the ages to the point at which Man made his first tool and began to work for a livelihood, and probably beyond that to a still remoter point. Therefore, if we would understand the present we must view it in the light of the past. Physically, individuals are one with their past. Each human being as an embryo follows the general lines of development of his ancestors and

carries with him in his adult form vestiges of organs which are now functionless. The examination of human thought and behaviour also reveals the existence of characteristics which demonstrate their historical and biological continuity with the thought and behaviour of human and animal ancestors. Man's mind contains "survivals" as well as his body, while, as we have already seen, "most, if not all, of the great institutions which still form the framework of civilised society have their roots in savagery, and have been handed down to us in these later days through countless generations, assuming new outward forms in the process of transmission, but remaining in their inmost core substantially unchanged."

The acceptance of this continuity of the whole evolutionary process is the first requisite to an understanding of modern society.

In trying to reconstruct the history of mankind in the periods which cover by far the greater part of its life and of which there are no written records, students rely mainly on three classes of evidence.

The first consists in the actual remains of

men, their skulls and other bones, which tell us what they were like in physical type in the distant past.

Secondly, we have the evidence of handiwork such as tools, weapons, and implements of various kinds, ornaments, heaps of domestic refuse; also remains of dwellings, earthworks, tracks, stone erections, burial places, paintings and carvings found in caves or on weapons. To the trained observer these objects tell much of the story of Man's mental activity and way of life in the past.

Thirdly, we have a different class of evidence, and one which must be used with caution—the habits, customs and beliefs, the industries and institutions of the various savage peoples still found in different parts of the world, whose way of living in its broad features cannot be very dissimilar from that of our primitive ancestors. What we must realise is that these ruder peoples have an ancestry as long as ours, yet they have stood still while we have advanced. Of this arrested progress there must be a cause, and it may lie in many of the characteristics which are observable; and the absence of

such features in the life of our primitive ancestors may have been the condition of a continuance of our development. There is certainly evidence from a number of examples that there has not necessarily been any exhaustion of the capacity for growth. To cite only one case, the Maoris of New Zealand were living a Neolithic type of life at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Tribal wars were incessant and their animistic beliefs made them eat their enemies' hearts to gain their courage. At the end of a century of contact with white civilisation, they have produced from among their number doctors, lawyers, and legislators.

These are the main sources of evidence, and while it may be doubted whether the collection and collation of this evidence have yet proceeded far enough to warrant more than tentative generalisations, there is a substantial agreement as to the main lines along which society has evolved since it first came into being. Here, however, we can only present the salient features of the story, and these only in outline.

The earliest men of whose condition of life

we have any knowledge were hunters, and weapons are among the earliest known artefacts. How it came about that Man adopted a flesh diet and the life of a hunter we can only guess, nor is there any means of knowing definitely what social organisation existed before and during the long ages when he hunted to satisfy his wants. But while there is no direct evidence as to the organisation of society at the hunting stage, arguing back from human nature, as we now know it, to the type of society which must have moulded and stamped it when in its most plastic state, and taking into account the physical conditions of life at the period during which Man is known to have been a hunter, there are grounds for the opinion that one of the earliest associations of human beings for a common purpose was that of the hunting pack. Analysis of the structure of any single pack is now impossible, but it is fairly certain that it had a leader. There are many questions to which we should like answers. On what grounds did the authority of the leader rest? Was the pack organised as a compact group of individuals bound together by ties

of kinship, obedient to the rule of a head from whom all the others had descended? Or was the regard for kinship at this stage slight, and did the leadership rest on outstanding skill, on magical powers or on some other basis? Were there any divisions within the group apart from the dichotomy of sex, and had division of labour or functions yet arisen? Did each pack have its own well-defined hunting ground as the Bushmen* once had and the Australian tribes† still have? How was the produce of the chase shared? To these, as to a multitude of other questions, the answers can be little more than plausible guesses.

No discussion of social development can be adequate which ignores Man's efforts at understanding his world and interpreting his experiences, for his ideas on these matters exercised a considerable influence on the whole of his behaviour. More potent in some respects than the influence of his actual material surroundings was the influence of his imaginary environment. From the dawn

* Stone, "Native Races in South Africa," p. 33.

† Spencer and Gillen, "Across Australia," p. 198.

of his intelligence Man was challenged by the world order outside him. Behind the phenomena he felt that there were powers of which the phenomena were only the manifestations, and with these powers he sought to establish a friendly relationship. Of course, the immaturity of his mind led him into all sorts of errors, one fertile source being his failure to distinguish between coincidence and causation. Despite the efficiency of his weapons and a strict regard to the other conditions of success, the hunter would often fail to kill or capture his prey. How could the failure be accounted for? Anything unusual might have happened before or during a hunt, and there would follow the conviction that this occurrence and his failure were causally connected. Mr. Carveth Read* cites a story of a party of Eskimos failing to secure a kill. One of them returned to the sledges for the ham-bone of a dog to eat, and returning with this in his hand he met and killed a seal. He never afterwards went hunting without carrying a ham-bone in his hand. The two events being connected in thought

* "The Origin of Man," p. 116.

were assumed to be connected in fact, and it was out of such general assumptions that Magic grew. For example, in the belief that objects and their representations are intimately connected, the North American Indians, in order to inflict injury on an enemy, will draw a figure of him on the ground and vigorously stab it with a sharp stick; and the Leron of Borneo, to encompass the death of someone he hates, makes a wooden image of him and leaves it in the jungle: as it decays the enemy dies. A large number of magical practices are based also on the supposition of a persistent sympathetic connection between objects which have been in contact. Hence a savage will believe that to injure or possibly destroy a man it is enough to place a lock of his hair in the fire, whilst some Welshmen still, to rid themselves of warts rub them with a piece of bacon which is afterwards buried in the ground: as it decomposes the warts disappear. Badly equipped with capacity for logical thought and scientific interpretation of experiences as our primitive ancestors were, belief in occult forces (Magic) and in the activity of spirits

(Animism) must have developed early. In the study of the political evolution of society, the significance of the assumption that natural phenomena generally, and men's lives in particular, were controlled by invisible powers lies in the efforts primitive man made to bring conduct into harmony with the rules and wills of these impersonal and personal forces, and the consequent establishing of the authority of leaders on the possession of occult gifts. The person or body to whom obedience became a vital necessity for the well-being of individual and community was the one who understood the mystery of securing the beneficent aid of the spirits which peopled primitive man's imaginary environment. Hence the place occupied in some present-day simple societies by the person variously named wizard, medicine man, shaman or priest, whose every dictate is heeded because of the occult or religious sanction behind it. The rise of such a class of functionaries at an early stage of social evolution is of great importance in that supreme power would tend to fall into the hands of men with the keenest intelligence

and greatest ability. Observers generally agree that the wizard of to-day is distinguished in his tribe for alertness and penetration, for great force of will and audacity in the practice of his art, and for extraordinary facility in extricating himself from awkward situations when his magical rites fail. In some existing communities the chief and the wizard are one, and the chieftainship rests on the occupant's supposed powers of sorcery; in others the medicine man is the chief's rival, and in contests the former usually wins, since to his opponents death comes speedily by poison. His influence over policy is great, and a war is never undertaken without his advice.*

It cannot be known definitely to what extent our ancestral hunters experienced the domination of a wizard caste. If the primitive packs were small, self-sufficing family groups living an unsettled life, the development of a separate class of magicians is improbable. It is, however, fairly certain that at an early stage the belief developed that dead ancestors were

* For a discussion of the position of the wizard in primitive societies see Frazer, "Early History of Kingship," and Read, "Origin of Man."

interested in and affected by the fortunes of their living descendants. We can perhaps assume that the head of the family, in the earliest stages, did naturally exercise dominion over its members by virtue of his hunting experience and skill, but later, with improvement of weapons and the adoption of new methods, a greater equality of skill would arise and leadership for strictly hunting purposes become less important. A new basis of authority would then become necessary, and it was probably found in the desire to please the ancestral ghosts. Ancestors had grown into veritable gods and were worshipped with due solemnity, and this would strengthen the position of chiefs and kings descended from them, and thus help in the formation and maintenance of stable and coherent governments when new economic conditions were tending to disintegrate the older organisation. Ancestor-worship is of much significance in connection with the history of inheritance and adoption, and of the gradual evolution of societies held together by blood-kinship to societies consolidated on other bases. If membership of a group had remained founded

on a common lineage and consanguinity had continued to be the sole ground of social co-operation, society as we know it to-day could not have become possible. If society was to grow, men of different descent had to be admitted into and amalgamated with the original brotherhood. The basis of adoption was provided by the worship and commemoration of ancestors, participation in the rites of which by anyone born outside the group becoming tantamount to the creation of a blood-tie. Worship of the same gods made all the celebrants of one flesh. A variant of this is found in the custom prevailing among the early tribes in Wales of conferring kinship on anyone who joined a kindred in the work of avenging the death of a kinsman. When we remember how strong in ancient life was the desire to maintain the continuity of family organisation, the growth of artificial methods of securing kinship becomes important.

It is necessary at this point to give some account of the family in the primitive organisation of society.* Of the many tribes

* For fuller discussion see Vinogradoff, "Historical Jurisprudence," vol. i., p. 163 onwards.

which have been described by Ethnology and History, however they may vary in customs and institutions, the fact has been revealed that they are all derived from some form of family organisation. Since all men, whatever else they may have grown to be in the community, must be the offspring of some kind of union between a father and mother, it is clear that the nature of these unions must of necessity react on all the other phases of social organisation. The divergent views which have been propounded as to the evolution of marriage need not concern us here. It is probably true that a large part of the human race has passed and is passing in its evolution through a stage in which the source of kinship and the stock of descent is the mother and not the father, but it is very unlikely that the development of marriage followed any one uniform course. At any rate, it is certain that in the case of all the more progressive peoples the patriarchal system was ultimately reached. This was the stage when descent was traced through the father, and the father was the more or less absolute ruler of the family.

With our earliest ancestors, capture led

to the greatest number of marital unions. There are among civilised peoples still a number of marriage customs which have preserved features suggestive of this stage. Where violence and capture provided the basis of union, it is evident that the physical superiority of the husband would colour the future relationships, for there was no question of mutual contract. Marriage depended more upon the law of property than on the law of relationship, a characteristic it has retained in civilised communities to this day. We find among different peoples a variety of practices which are the outcome of the principle. It operates that the children belong to the male to whom the mother belongs, irrespective of any actual physical paternity. In Hindu and Mohammedan law, as William Robertson Smith points out, this is a fundamental doctrine, and customs such as wife-lending, which seem strange and contradictory to our Western ideas of sexual morality, are based thereon. Suttee in India was another example of the proprietary rights held by husbands over wives, while many of the anomalies in our own marriage laws are survivals of this

view. The element of contract which is inherent in our connotation of the term marriage entered later with changed conditions of life when a wife could be procured without resort to force. The formation of groups of kinsmen agreeing as to conditions, and binding themselves to ensure compliance, laid the foundation of a wife's legal position, her rights being protected through resting on a specific agreement between the kindreds. It is worthy of note that marriage originally was not a transaction between husband and wife but between the patriarchs of their respective kindreds. The contractual element probably emerged first in a chief's demand for compensation for the loss he incurred through being deprived of his kinswoman's services. This is in keeping with the prevailing status of the individual. What rights he enjoyed were not his own as a person but merely as a member of a family or tribe. Outside the community no rights were recognised. What mattered was the well-being and continuity of the group as a group and, therefore, personal rights and liberties were in the main non-existent.

Turning now to the specific evidence available for Britain it is possible to give a more or less consecutive and coherent account of social development.

For a period, probably not less than a hundred thousand years, we find the Paleolithic civilisation developing. Man was waging a ceaseless struggle with his environment, gradually but surely improving his means of mastering it. We find his mind at work trying to synthesise his fragmentary experiences into some sort of science and philosophy, in seeking to establish some kind of harmony with the world-order as it appeared to him, and in endeavouring to establish the conditions of physical well-being. At an early stage there was some division of labour and function. The advantages of specialisation would soon make themselves manifest. One became a hunter, another a worker in flint, or a craftsman in horn and bone; still another would be chosen because of exceptional skill to be an engraver of pictures, a carver of ivory and stone, or a miner in the chalk pits: perhaps even a priest or shaman. There are also indications that

trade routes from place to place had already developed, signifying that exchange of the products of specialised labour had begun. Then came a transition period during which climatic changes slowly transformed the physical aspect of the land and wrought a fundamental change in Man's economic outlook. He had to adopt new methods to secure his food supply. In the succeeding Neolithic Age, which lasted in this country from eight to ten thousand years, we find a big step forward taken by Man in his methods of obtaining a livelihood. Apart from a vast improvement in his implements, he began, under the force of economic pressure, to become less of a hunter and more of a farmer. Also, the increased demand for tools led to a more systematic mining for flints, and to a localisation of manufacture. Villages grew up near the mines, and what might be called implement factories were established there. There is evidence, too, that a considerable amount of internal trade was carried on.

Following the organisation best suited for gaining a livelihood by hunting, we find

domestication of animals and the spread of agriculture leading to more permanent settlements. Some of these—for example, the common platform and encircling palisade of the lake dwellings, the earthwork defences of the pit dwellings, and the strong dry-stone walls surrounding the beehive huts—demanded a corporate effort for their execution and provide for us to-day evidence of a conscious social organisation. The development of village life was probably effected in Britain as far back as Neolithic times. After what has been already said, it is hardly necessary to add that the village was in all probability the dwelling-place of a group of kinsfolk recognising their common descent and held together by ties of blood and of mutual interest. The groups were independent and autonomous, whilst evidence of chieftainship is supplied by the long barrows or grave mounds of this period. These can hardly represent a general method of interment, for they are too few in number. Their size—indicating as it does the labour of many men for many weeks—is accepted as suggesting that a whole clan was concerned in thus

honouring one who was held in high esteem. At this stage of development Man's social horizon was rigidly bounded by the encircling fortifications of his little community. Nor must the significance of the fortifications themselves be forgotten. Property was beginning to accumulate. There were flocks and herds and grain—all the result of months of steady toil—and others knowing of them conceived the notion that these things could be obtained by themselves far more swiftly by raid and pillage, and they acted accordingly. In the earlier hunting stage there was little incentive to plunder, for existence was necessarily one of hand to mouth, and it was due to this that strife had been probably limited to such provocations as wife-capture and trespass in the hunting-grounds. But with the increased production of wealth and its accumulation, violent acquisitiveness manifested itself. The desire to obtain as much wealth as possible with a minimum of effort provided also the motive for taking prisoners in the raids and compelling them to work. Such labour was cheap and desirable because captives having no blood-ties in the group

could claim none of the rights of property and inheritance pertaining to kinship, and so slavery became a social institution. Hence we find developing a pronounced horizontal stratification of society with a regrouping of its members on an economic basis. Taking the evidence—fragmentary, it is true, and too slender to warrant our being dogmatic—it can hardly be doubted that in the Bronze Age slave labour was exploited on a large scale; predatory intertribal wars were common (if the strength and frequency of hill-forts can be relied on as clues), and the captives of both sexes were reduced to slavery and became like their goods and chattels the absolute property of their captors. Since children born of slaves would take the status of their parents the class grew, and it is believed that in the Iron Age an export trade in slaves was carried on. It would seem that by the Bronze Age social organisation had advanced beyond the Neolithic clan or village of kinsmen. It is assumed that as the population of each village increased, overflow villages grew up round the parent community, and a certain measure of decentralisation had

been effected, each dependent village being governed by a minor chief, whose authority within the confines of the village was absolute, but who in matters affecting the whole tribe acknowledged the supremacy of the tribal chief. Next we come to a factor which has played a most important part in the development of social organisation in general and of the State in particular—namely, conquest and subjugation. Towards the close of the Bronze Age we see the beginning of conditions which kept the population of Britain in a state of flux and fusion for many centuries. There is no need to discuss in detail the successive waves of immigrants and conquerors who settled here; most brought new ways of living and methods of wealth production.

Were there space it would be interesting to show the part played in cultural developments by the wide movements of men in primitive times. The discoveries by Dr. Rivers and Professor Elliot Smith of evidence of the spread (possibly from Egypt) of sun-worship, megalithic monuments and the arts, irrigation and mummifying to the islands of

the Pacific and to Peru,* are of great significance. Voluntary or compulsory imitation probably played a far more important part in the development of religious ideas and general culture than has been hitherto thought. Here we can do no more than mention it as one factor in social evolution. Generally, however, the possession of a greater capacity for creating wealth resulted in economic and therefore political ascendancy. At any rate, this was what happened in Britain, for the final result of the prolonged series of immigrations and invasions was a still further horizontal stratification of society and the emergence of a State consisting of a ruling class that claimed and established by force their right to direct the life of the whole of society. Such in rough outline is the story of the evolution of our society.

Taking a bird's-eye view of the whole process, we see a continuous development in certain directions. We see how on the economic side there has been a gradual

* For a summary of the theory see the chapter on "The Aims of Ethnology" in Rivers' "Psychology and Politics."

growth in men's mastery over nature and in specialisation and division of labour; also we see, with the increase in capacity for wealth production, the coming of the economic subjugation of the many by the few and the horizontal stratification of society into economic classes; on the political side we see the community based on kinship making way for a community consolidated on the basis of local contiguity; this, in its turn, was followed by a society in which physical force and economic ascendancy determined status. We see sovereignty changing its ground until ultimately the State emerges as an organisation in which the right to issue commands and enforce obedience consists in what is earned by conquest and by the resultant ownership of the chief source of wealth—land. Fastening our attention on the individual, we see him combining with the members of his group in waging a ceaseless struggle with his environment and gradually but surely improving his means of mastering it. We find him constantly adapting his life to win greater freedom from the tyranny of his physical circumstances. The tools,

weapons, clothes, dwellings, of each age are the material representations of the efforts of Man's mind or spirit to secure the conditions of well-being. We find his mind at work also trying to synthesise his fragmentary experiences into some sort of science and philosophy, and seeking to establish some kind of harmony with the world-order as it appeared to him. We see his deepest longing manifesting itself: he desires to feel at home in the universe. It is in this impulse, perhaps, that we find the key to the evolutionary process: it is in Man's effort to secure a harmonious relationship with his world and to win freedom from the despotism of circumstance. The measure to which he succeeds is the measure of his progress. This does not mean that we identify evolution with progress. To determine whether an evolutionary development is progressive, a standard of value is necessary, for not all growth is good. Evolution has produced slavery, war, disease, slums, and the many other unwholesome features of our civilisation—features which are inimical to a harmonious life. But to have been the product of the evolutionary process is no

justification for the persistence of an evil, whether it embodies itself in a custom, in a law, or in an institution.

There is no belief so stultifying as that which accepts human progress or human decline as inevitable. There is no cosmic law which makes it compulsory that modern civilisation should go forward to still greater achievements nor that it should, like the civilisations of the past, complete its cycle and pass away. The future of civilisation is what its bearers will make it. The force of destiny is within Man; it lies in the quality of his ideals and in the determination with which he works for their realisation. Evolution is no basis for a barren fatalism; rather is it a challenge for us to take up the task of embodying in every phase of life the moral principles and ideas to which at our best we pay homage.

WE cannot understand conduct without knowing something of the springs and motive powers of human thought and action. Up to recent years Psychology was mainly a study of individual consciousness, subjective and introspective in character. The psychologist, looking inwards, observed the happenings in his own mind and used them as the basis for a general theory of normal mental processes. In its later development, however, Psychology without entirely repudiating the earlier method relies more upon comparative and objective methods of research, turning its attention to the outward manifestations of mind—*i.e.*, the actions of behaviour of human beings. The study of behaviour among the lower organisms had been conducted by biologists and comparative psychologists for a considerable time, for behaviour was the only method whereby it was possible to know anything of the causes

of their responses to external stimuli. Beginning with the tropisms of microscopic protozoa, it was seen that such simple organisms display more or less definite modes of behaviour or action-systems as they have been called, the dynamic impulse behind which arises from the constitution of organic matter. Higher in the animal scale the source of direction and regulation of behaviour was traced to certain specialised cells and fibres which constitute the nervous system; these when stimulated from the outside give rise to an almost automatic response known as reflex action.

With animals in which the nervous system has developed to the extent of possessing a brain, means are provided for more complex forms of behaviour, for with a central nervous system reflex actions are connected and co-ordinated. Combinations of reflex actions constitute the central fact in what is known as instinct. An instinct, however, is something more than a compound reflex action. Instinctive action does not follow merely from the awareness of an object; it involves also the other recognised aspects of psychical

process—a feeling in regard to that object and a striving towards it or away from it. The perception of an object, it is maintained, involves some kind of emotional excitement which causes the organism “to act to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action.”* It is hardly necessary to point out the part which instinctive action plays in enabling the lower animals to live for any length of time. In those cases where all action depends on the guidance of instinct, it is necessary that it should be effective from the beginning; to wait for experience or instruction would mean destruction. It is generally known that “pheasants, plovers, moorhen, domestic chicks and ducklings, with many others, are active soon after birth and exhibit powers of complex co-ordination with little or no practice of the necessary limb movements. They walk and balance so soon and so well as to show that this mode of action is congenital, and has not to be acquired through the guidance of experience. Young water birds swim with neat orderly strokes the first time they are

* McDougall, “Social Psychology,” p. 29.

gently placed in the water. Even little chicks a day or two old can swim well.”*

With the evolution of the brain there also came into being certain unspecialised areas of neural cells and fibres, in which are recorded the effects of many of the actions of the organism. This record constitutes what is called associative memory, and this memory has a very important influence in modifying behaviour. In animals far below man in the scale of mental development there is found a capacity of learning by experience. It is exemplified in the case of the chick which at first instinctively pecks at a variety of objects. “If it pecks at a yellow caterpillar with an unpleasant taste, it will drop it. The next time, or after a series of such experiences, it will avoid the caterpillar,” the explanation being not that a general idea or a true memory has yet arisen, but that the perception of each individual caterpillar has acquired a special meaning to the chick. It has become associated with an unpleasant experience, and the instinctive reaction to the sense impression is modified thereby.

* Lloyd Morgan, “Animal Behaviour,” p. 84.

This is the rudimentary form of the intelligence which reaches its fullest development in Man and constitutes his chief distinguishing characteristic. This is the stage of conceptual thought, in which activity is not guided solely by the presence of the object perceived. There is now a consciously envisaged end towards which actions are co-ordinated. Man can make plans and shape his actions with ideal ends in view.

With the recognition of the continuity of human with animal evolution, not only as regards physical but also mental characteristics, it became increasingly necessary that Psychology should supplement its method of introspection by utilising similar lines of approach to the study of human behaviour as had proved useful in the study of the actions of lower organisms. This biological treatment of mind has yielded important results, and so ardent have some of its exponents become that they have sought to reconstitute Psychology as a purely objective Science under the name of "Behaviourism." The method of investigation suggested by the title has certainly

resulted in throwing new light on the nature of instinct and on the content of the human mind.

In the first place, it has shown the close relation which exists between emotion and instinctive reactions. Fear, for example, is shown to be an aspect of consciousness associated with the reaction to danger by flight; anger is related to the reaction to danger or injury by aggression; love is associated with the parental and sexual instincts, and so forth.

Secondly, the use of this method has demonstrated the inadequacy of the earlier view of instinct as a mode of activity characteristic of the lower animals, as distinguished from intelligence which was held to be the supreme if not the only factor in regulating human behaviour. The modern psychologist regards the wide difference between the behaviour of Man and that of the animals as not a difference of kind but rather of degree. On the one hand, animals of a low order have been found to show a capacity for learning from experience and for adapting themselves to unusual conditions, and these

were once considered to be distinctive features of "intelligent" behaviour. On the other hand, it has been realised that Man's behaviour is far less subject to the control of reason and intelligence than was formerly supposed. Under certain circumstances it is difficult to see in what way his reactions differ from the behaviour of the unreasoning and instinct-guided brutes. This irrationality Psychology now explains by pointing out that mentally Man is as much the product of evolution as he is physically. He has inherited from his human and pre-human ancestors a mental equipment in which instinctive and emotional factors play a big part. Just as there are revealed in Man's body the vestigial forms of organs which functioned on the lower levels of development, so in his mental make-up there have survived the impulses and tendencies which almost entirely directed and controlled the actions of his animal and remotest human ancestors. To this discovery of inherited instinctive tendencies as the basis of human character there was added some twenty years ago a technique known as psycho-

analysis, which enabled investigators to gain access to the unconscious region of the mind and to demonstrate further the immense influence on decision and judgment of emotional experiences and the instincts with which they are so closely linked.

It should be noted that "the Unconscious" is used by psycho-analysts in a somewhat technical sense. It does not refer to that large part of our experience which at a given moment is outside the focus of attention, but which can by the ordinary processes of memory and association of ideas be often brought into it. By "the Unconscious," in its relation to experience, is meant that kind which cannot by either of these normal methods be recalled into the field of consciousness; for its recall, special conditions such as hypnotism and sleep are necessary.

But its inaccessibility does not render this buried mental life less potent in its distorting influence on our thoughts and actions. In this underworld of the mind—the Unconscious—there is pent up an emotional and instinctive life of a rude and primitive character, incompatible with or dangerous for well-being

in modern civilised communities; and, because of its nature, its manifestations are restrained by powerful barriers which have been slowly acquired during the civilisation of the race and the training of the individual. These unconscious impulses, we are told, are not annihilated as the result of repression, but remain active throughout life. Normally, however, they do not secure egress without being "sublimated" into forms of expression which accord better with the demands of modern social standards. The warlike impulses, for example, through the process of sublimation, find less harmful outlets in the various forms of competitive sports, and the maternal cravings of spinsters are often expressed in philanthropic work among children and the sick, or in extravagant care for animal pets, the choice being largely determined by the environment in which they have been brought up. Nor is the censorship exercised over the repressed desires and instincts always effective. When this is the case, there follows a relapse to a cruder and more primitive manifestation, such as occurs when ethical restraints are temporarily para-

lysed under the influence of alcohol or when an individual is acting as one of an excited mob. An outbreak of the impulses in more or less their original forms may also occur when repression has been carried to the extent of denying to them any suitable outlets whatever.

The study of the effects of repression is extremely helpful in the effort to understand various forms of social unrest. The extent to which instinctive dispositions operate in industrial activity* is becoming more widely recognised, and if repression leads, as is maintained by the psycho-analysts, to neurotic disorders or to an accumulated tension, then we have a clue to one and perhaps the most important cause of industrial discontent. A system of mechanical employment which provides no outlets for the manifestation of those innate impulsive forces is one likely to result in periodic outbreaks of unrest. The corollary to this is the provision in industry of greater scope for self-expression, but this we cannot discuss now. A way of

* See "Instincts in Industry," by Tead; also "Instinct of Workmanship," by Veblen.

escape which is frequently provided by most of us is through "rationalisation." This is the process of finding reasons for what our instincts impel us to do. Its operation is often expressed in the phrase "the wish is father to the thought," which implies a recognition of the fact that we are constantly allowing our instinctive desires to influence our opinions and judgments, and that we are ever trying to cover our emotional beliefs with the garb of reason. The extent to which this element of distortion enters into the formation of our ideas on all kinds of social issues is perhaps not fully realised. Its existence, however, should always be recognised and its operation neutralised if we desire our judgments to be in accord with reality.

Before we point out the significance to Sociology of the results of recent psychological investigation, it is necessary to realise certain important truths which we can do little more than mention here. First, our innate instinctive tendencies cannot be thought of as separate and self-subsistent impulses each in its turn holding exclusive sway in deter-

mining conduct. They tend to counteract and modify one another, as when individual tendencies come into conflict with the social or gregarious factors.

The second fact is that instincts manifest themselves in varying ways, according to the experience of the individual and the kind of world into which he was born. His "social heritage" (the traditions and conventions of the society in which he is brought up) determines largely the manner in which his inherited dispositions will express themselves; environment, home, school, reading—all serve from early life to mould and shape and fashion a particular tendency in certain ways.

The third fact is that human behaviour is seldom, if ever, purely instinctive, and that, as Professor Graham Wallas argues in "The Great Society," reason is "not merely a subordinate mechanism acting only in obedience to the previous stimulation of one of the simpler instincts." Emphasis on the influence of impulse on behaviour has led some writers to regard reason as being incapable of initiating action and of limiting its activity

to the finding of means to ends determined by instinct.

The conscious self cannot be regarded as two separate entities, a lower and baser "Titan," a creature of savage instincts struggling for mastery with a higher and nobler being guided solely by rational purposes. It is not possible to split up personality thus into two compartments. "Reason, sense, will and impulse are modes of manifestation of the self, ways in which it asserts and maintains itself. The energy involved is the energy of the total self, which no doubt takes various forms and finds for itself different channels, according as the activity is impulsive or voluntary, but which remains essentially one. Conflict, of course, there is, but it is a conflict within the self and not between the self and something else outside it. The disharmonies of life are due . . . not to the fact that an entity called reason is overcome by other entities called impulses, but rather to the fact that the self has not attained to that degree of harmonisation or organisation of the impulses which it is the function of the rational impulse operating

within them to bring about.”* In short, Man is able consciously to envisage ends and to direct the flow of conational energy in their direction.

Keeping these facts in mind we can now turn to a brief consideration of the significance of certain of the instinctive dispositions in the study of social phenomena. In the sociological application of the new Psychology, attention has been focussed mainly upon discussions concerning acquisitiveness and herd instinct.

In view of the trend of modern theorising on political and economic problems it is necessary to know whether Man possesses an instinct of acquisition and, if so, to ascertain how it has been modified by other instincts or by the other factors operating in the making of character—social tradition and individual intelligence. Dr. Rivers, in discussing the question in his suggestive book on “Instinct and the Unconscious,” examines the varying manifestations of instinct in animals. He shows how strong is the impulse to hoard among bees, its operation being

* Ginsberg, “The Psychology of Society,” pp. 36, 37.

unaffected by the amount of honey already accumulated; but in the case of many species of birds the acquisition of individual rights over territory operates only in spring. . He quotes Mr. Eliot Howard's "Territory in Bird Life," which shows how, shortly before mating, a cock bird establishes a monopoly over an area of land ranging from half an acre to several acres in extent, and from which he chases any other cock of his species. When his ownership has been firmly established, he is sought by a female bird, and mating and breeding take place. As soon as the young have been reared and until the mating season again returns, these birds are gregarious and sociable, living their peaceful communal life. Dr. Rivers points out that the special interest of this phenomenon lies in its illustration of the connection between the instinct of acquisition and the parental function, a connection which is further illustrated in the case of the Melanesians. Among these people, he found communism practised on an extensive scale. Objects such as weapons and utensils which a man has made for himself are by general consent regarded

as his individual property, but land and canoes are held in common, "and there is a striking absence of such disputes concerning the right of use as we might expect from the example of our own individualistic society."* With regard to land, all that is uncleared is the joint property of the tribe, but any member may clear a plot for the use of his family group, each member of which can use the joint holding and take produce from the part cultivated by other members of the group. In all such cases there is complete harmony. In one island, however, where it was customary for a man to mark out from the family-holding a garden for each of his children, disputes concerning the ownership of these individually owned plots and the right to use their produce were frequent, whilst in the case of the rest of the land reserved for common use there was never any quarrelling.

One feature of resemblance between the acquisition of individual territories among birds and the Melanesian example of land-tenure lies in the fact that both are connected

* Rivers, "Instinct and the Unconscious," p. 269.

with the exercise of the parental function; and another is that on the original area still occupied by the males which have failed to find mates there is no fighting, while in Melanesia also, strife only arises concerning the territories which have been acquired by individuals. With the birds, apart from the mating season, the instinct of aggression in relation to the acquisition of territory is suppressed or greatly modified by the needs of the gregarious life, and with the Melanesian also, the instinct of acquisition has been kept in check in the interest of social necessity.

From a consideration of this and other available evidence it would seem that in Man as in many animals there is an instinct of acquisition, which can, however, be so greatly modified in response to gregarious needs that it practically disappears; though under special circumstances, more particularly through the operation of the parental instinct, it is liable to reassert itself. In the case of the birds, it might be maintained that the modification of the instinct in the interests of the community which takes place between

the mating seasons is also instinctive, being due to the activity of a gregarious or herd instinct, but whether in the case of the Melanesian it has been modified by the operation of instinct or through social tradition is not certain. In any case, Dr. Rivers concludes that "If this modification or disappearance needs the direct action of a gregarious instinct, there are no great hopes that the highly individualistic attitude of our own society towards property can suffer modification. If, on the other hand, such modification or suppression can take place through the agency of social tradition and example, those who advocate a change in our social attitude towards property can be much more hopeful."* The gregarious instinct in its strict scientific sense and as manifested among the lower animals and primitive peoples, despite its potency in some directions, is considerably weakened by civilisation. It involves a high degree of suggestibility and generally a low order of intelligence. Those who hope for a different organisation of society, in which regard for private property

* *Loc. cit.*, p. 272.

unaffected by the amount of honey already accumulated; but in the case of many species of birds the acquisition of individual rights over territory operates only in spring. He quotes Mr. Eliot Howard's "Territory in Bird Life," which shows how, shortly before mating, a cock bird establishes a monopoly over an area of land ranging from half an acre to several acres in extent, and from which he chases any other cock of his species. When his ownership has been firmly established, he is sought by a female bird, and mating and breeding take place. As soon as the young have been reared and until the mating season again returns, these birds are gregarious and sociable, living their peaceful communal life. Dr. Rivers points out that the special interest of this phenomenon lies in its illustration of the connection between the instinct of acquisition and the parental function, a connection which is further illustrated in the case of the Melanesians. Among these people, he found communism practised on an extensive scale. Objects such as weapons and utensils which a man has made for himself are by general consent regarded

as his individual property, but land and canoes are held in common, "and there is a striking absence of such disputes concerning the right of use as we might expect from the example of our own individualistic society."* With regard to land, all that is uncleared is the joint property of the tribe, but any member may clear a plot for the use of his family group, each member of which can use the joint holding and take produce from the part cultivated by other members of the group. In all such cases there is complete harmony. In one island, however, where it was customary for a man to mark out from the family-holding a garden for each of his children, disputes concerning the ownership of these individually owned plots and the right to use their produce were frequent, whilst in the case of the rest of the land reserved for common use there was never any quarrelling.

One feature of resemblance between the acquisition of individual territories among birds and the Melanesian example of land-tenure lies in the fact that both are connected

* Rivers, "Instinct and the Unconscious," p. 269.

with the exercise of the parental function; and another is that on the original area still occupied by the males which have failed to find mates there is no fighting, while in Melanesia also, strife only arises concerning the territories which have been acquired by individuals. With the birds, apart from the mating season, the instinct of aggression in relation to the acquisition of territory is suppressed or greatly modified by the needs of the gregarious life, and with the Melanesian also, the instinct of acquisition has been kept in check in the interest of social necessity.

From a consideration of this and other available evidence it would seem that in Man as in many animals there is an instinct of acquisition, which can, however, be so greatly modified in response to gregarious needs that it practically disappears; though under special circumstances, more particularly through the operation of the parental instinct, it is liable to reassert itself. In the case of the birds, it might be maintained that the modification of the instinct in the interests of the community which takes place between

the mating seasons is also instinctive, being due to the activity of a gregarious or herd instinct, but whether in the case of the Melanesian it has been modified by the operation of instinct or through social tradition is not certain. In any case, Dr. Rivers concludes that "If this modification or disappearance needs the direct action of a gregarious instinct, there are no great hopes that the highly individualistic attitude of our own society towards property can suffer modification. If, on the other hand, such modification or suppression can take place through the agency of social tradition and example, those who advocate a change in our social attitude towards property can be much more hopeful."* The gregarious instinct in its strict scientific sense and as manifested among the lower animals and primitive peoples, despite its potency in some directions, is considerably weakened by civilisation. It involves a high degree of suggestibility and generally a low order of intelligence. Those who hope for a different organisation of society, in which regard for private property

* *Loc. cit.*, p. 272.

will be much weakened and ultimately made to disappear, must look to agencies other than crude herd instinct to modify the anti-social instincts. They must also take into account the fact that the parental instinct manifesting itself in an effort to secure the best conditions possible for the offspring will, so long as securing satisfaction for the physical wants of children is a parental duty, keep in operation the acquisitive instinct. We cannot, however, thus summarily dismiss the gregarious or herd instinct from our discussion, for its study concerns Sociology more intimately even than the instinct of acquisition, because it has come into existence in order to produce and maintain group cohesion. Its essential function is to lead all the members of a group to act together for the achievement of the common purpose of securing its welfare. We see its operation in the familiar sight of a flock of birds in flight acting together as a body with almost unfailing precision. It is also strong in the case of primitive peoples who, according to Dr. Rivers and other travellers, have a capacity for arriving at collective decisions and of securing corporate

action by some subtle means outside the reach of normal civilised beings.

When we discuss herd instinct in relation to civilised communities caution must be exercised. We have already emphasised the danger of interpreting individual behaviour as a mere balance of instincts, and the importance of realising that Man possesses the capacity for turning the energy with which instincts are invested into the channels of his choice, and it is equally necessary to point out the impossibility of explaining the whole of social life in terms of any one instinct or any number of instincts.

It is clear that co-operation in society and in the various groups into which it has been divided rests on instinctive tendencies, but instinct alone does not explain the variety of these groups nor how some have come to be formed by conscious and deliberate organisation. There are other factors operating in determining in which particular group a person chooses to co-operate, such as intelligence, experience, and family tradition. But the feature of herd instinct which has received most attention is that known as " suggestion,"

which has been defined as "a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance."* This is the aspect also which has loomed largest in discussions of its psychological consequences on human behaviour in modern society.

The reformer has always been troubled by the irrationality of Man, and some writers have come to regard the future as hopeless until we can breed a species of men who will be more amenable to the guidance of pure reason, and who will hold truths only when they are scientifically verifiable. Investigators into the operation of the gregarious impulse point out, however, that the trouble is not that we have a definite preference for unreason, but that the suggestibility which is the agency through which collective action is possible in the herd or flock still characterises in a large measure our mental make-up. The instinct in Man, we are told, manifests itself not only in a strong disposition to be in, and to always remain with, a social aggregate,

* McDougall, "Social Psychology," p. 97.

but also in disposing us to accept without question everything that comes to us from or with the authority of our particular herd. Its importance lies, therefore, in the fact that it gives to the opinions, customs, conventions, laws, and ideals which are developed in a group a kind of instinctive sanction.

It would not be difficult to show that most of the opinions which people hold are irrational in the sense that they have never been thought out by those who hold them. If we took stock of our beliefs we should find that those to which we cling most tenaciously and which seem to us most convincing are those which we have never argued out for ourselves or attempted to verify. In short, they are the product of herd suggestion, and being so, they have the quality of obviousness which is the essential characteristic of instinctive opinion. It is unquestionable that this mental quality of suggestibility is a fact of the utmost importance and sociological significance. Dr. Trotter* has shown that it is evident in man's behaviour not only in crowds and in other circumstances of association, but also in his behaviour as an isolated individual.

* *The Sociological Review*, July, 1908.

If it is as potent a factor as we are told, then it is important that this readiness to accept without question whatever views reach us from a source we deem authoritative enough should be enlisted for the creation of a saner attitude and finer and wider ideals in the minds of men. As Dr. Trotter puts it: "If rationality were once to become really respectable, if we feared the entertaining of an unverifiable opinion with the warmth with which we fear using the wrong implement at the dinner-table, if the thought of holding a prejudice disgusted us as does a foul disease, then the dangers of man's suggestibility would be turned to advantage."* How this can be achieved is perhaps the fundamental social problem in our civilisation. We cannot discuss it here, but it certainly seems that the immediate task is for those who, in a fuller measure than most, have the power of developing independent ideas and of rising above the general standards of their society, to take hold of the great formative agents of public opinion and morality in the interest not of class or party, but of reason and truth.

* *The Sociological Review*, January, 1909.

THE ascertaining of whether there are permanent factors operating in the life of nations, giving meaning and unity to their history and determining the type of social and political organisation evolved by them, is an important branch of sociological enquiry. In recent years the scientific study of savage and coloured races has proceeded far, and has already begun to influence colonial administration and the management of natives and native affairs, and likewise to ensure the sympathetic discernment of fundamental causes which are necessary as a basis of international standing. The investigation of the question of whether there are any permanent innate differences in the mental and moral make-up of civilised nations, impelling and directing their development, is of immense practical importance. The earlier attempts to elucidate the divergent histories of nations by reference to some one decisive cause created two opposing schools of opinion,

which have been described as the "geographical" and the "hereditarian." To the former "the soil was the nation." Whatever features were found to be distinctive in the various nations and races from which they had sprung were the direct results of geographical and climatic conditions. This was the thesis developed by Buckle in England and by von Ihering in Germany, while numerous other writers have subscribed to it.

According to von Ihering's* exposition of the theory the original "Aryan" stock when they left their first home were stamped with a common character by the physical environment of their original Fatherland. The differences in national characters subsequently developed by the Celts, Teutons, Slavs, Greeks, Romans, Iranians, and Hindus were entirely the result of the different environing features of the lands in which they settled. Each national character, once formed, became crystallised and ever afterwards remained the same, being henceforward transmitted

* "The Evolution of the Aryan." Translated by A. Drucker.

by racial heredity. This is exemplified by the statement that the characters of the Celts and Teutons, as described by Cæsar and Tacitus, are fundamentally the same as those revealed by their descendants to-day.

It should be noted that von Ihering does not make it clear at what precise point in national development physical environment ceased to exercise its modifying influence. Even if we give to environment the most restricted denotation, narrowing it down to such stable conditions as soil and weather, it would seem reasonable to assume that the considerable changes in their methods of dealing with these factors would have affected the Celts and Teutons. If soil is so potent an influence in the moulding of character surely it matters whether you grow food on it or dig into its bowels for minerals; if weather is so powerful a formative agent, it must be of importance whether you check its work by elaborate clothing and the construction of houses, and these things both Celts and Teutons have done since Cæsar and Tacitus wrote. If we extend the use of the term to include the less stable factors, as

von Ihering did to the varied relationships of the inhabitants of a territory with those of lands geographically connected with it, it becomes still more difficult to see why the national characters of these people should have remained unchanged during the period when geographical situation has lost so much of its meaning. This point is raised, not as an attempt to minimise the influence of environment, but to emphasise the need for clearness as to its whole content and for an understanding of the relative potency of the elements of which it is constituted.

A more convincing statement of the geographical theory was that by von Ihering's compatriot Ratzel,* who also argued that the differences between nations are entirely due to the differences in their environment. He doubts whether in general physical and mental capacity we to-day are far ahead of our ancestors; what advance has been affected is due to the manner in which we have dealt with the enviroing circumstances which have

* "The History of Mankind." Translated by A. J. Butler.

stimulated and challenged us. We have "laboured more, acquired more, lived more rapidly, and above all, have kept what we have acquired, and known how to use it." Groups of people, Ratzel argues, are not different because of variations in the nature of their inherited mental endowment—which is almost constant and does not perceptibly vary in different nations—but rather because the external circumstances upon which this constant hereditary factor has operated have been different. National character will thus change from epoch to epoch, as changes take place in the operative conditions of the people's lives, the innate qualities of mind remaining practically stationary. Marx's contribution to the theory consisted in the isolation of the economic factor and in emphasising the dominating potency in the historical process of "the means and methods of wealth production and distribution." "Legal relationships and forms of Government," he says in the Preface to his "Critique of Political Economy," "cannot be explained either by themselves or by the so-called development of the human mind, but on the

contrary have their roots in the conditions of men's physical existence. . . . The method prevailing in any society of producing the material livelihood determines the social, political and intellectual life in general. It is not primarily men's (social) consciousness which determines their mode of life; on the contrary, it is their social life which determines their consciousness." Hence, all History is conceived of in terms of an economic struggle for control of land and the means of production and social evolution interpreted as being successive stages of slavery, serfdom, wage-earning, leading to ultimate freedom for the proletariat by the complete overthrow of the capitalist system. This abstraction and isolation of the economic factor in the historical process, and its development into a philosophy of History, has been of the greatest importance. It has called attention to a mass of data which has done much "to light up our perception" of the historical process. It has shown how economic conditions have contributed to the creation of social and moral customs and beliefs whose reflection is found in art, science, and religion as well

as in legal and political institutions, and has become thereby the inspiration of a great movement.

It is unfortunate that so many of the later protagonists of the economic interpretation of History are more concerned with proclaiming it as an absolute truth than with arguing it, while their opponents show more enthusiasm in abusing than in examining it. It is doubtful whether Marx and Engels were as much concerned with the theoretical formulation of the philosophy of History as they were with the practical applications of what is indubitably a truth—viz., that a close correspondence reveals itself in the various stages of human development between the economic structure of society and its legal and political institutions, and between the ways in which men secure their livelihood and their mental and moral life.

Few honest students would deny that the insistence on the potency of economic factors has given a new meaning to the sequence of historical events and movements, but to isolate and treat by itself a factor or group of factors, though necessary as a method of

elucidation, is always dangerous unless we keep in mind the relative importance of all the forces which have operated in History. The test of historical materialism, however, is not in the fact that we agree or disagree with its practical implications, but in its adequacy as an explanation of historical phenomena: not whether we like or dislike the doctrine of the class war, but whether a dispassionate review of the facts will warrant the reduction of History into a single all-embracing formula. Perhaps no greater disservice can be done to the cause of making general the recognition of the influence exercised by economic conditions on the ideas and conduct of individuals and on the social and political life of human communities than to assert in a spirit of ecclesiastical dogmatism the non-existence of other forces, religious and personal, for instance, and to seek to transform economic interpretation into a metaphysical dogma of deterministic materialism.

To return to the hereditarian school, there is no useful purpose to be served in discussing the fantastic extravagances of the race theorists of the nineteenth century, in as much

as, following a strong tendency to deny altogether the influence of hereditary racial dispositions on the social and political development of nations, the pendulum has swung back somewhat and the importance of race as the determinant of national character and of its expression in art, science, and social organisation, is being reasserted by a number of writers, notably by Professor McDougall in two of his works, "The Group Mind" and "National Welfare and National Decay."

Taking the argument as formulated by Professor McDougall, it may be briefly stated as follows:

The task of explaining the causes which operated in first dividing mankind into well differentiated races is avoided, and we are asked to start off from the assumption that the three fundamental races of Europe are the fair, tall and long-headed Nordic race; the Alpine, darker, shorter and round-headed; and the Mediterranean, darkish, short and long-headed. Corresponding to these typical physical characteristics are certain definite mental characteristics, so that

whenever we find one physical type dominant, we can infer the dominance of the correlated mental type.

The Nordic type of character is that which prevails in England, its leading features being a strong sense of independence, a dislike of being governed, expressing itself politically in a tendency to decentralise, together with pronounced individualism, enterprise, and initiative.

The antithesis of these qualities characterise the other two races as illustrated, for example, in France, where, though the three races are represented, the Nordic strain is definitely the weakest. The French, we are told, are sociable and gregarious, lack individual enterprise and initiative, and tend to submit to and rely on strong centralised government. Such in brief is the theory.

Now, at this point a cautionary word is necessary as to the methods of race identification. That there are certain physical differences between well-defined groups of people is fairly obvious. Complexion and colour, for example, and the head-form, which is indicated by what is known as a cephalic index—

the proportion of breadth to length—these have provided the anthropologists with a basis for the division of the world's inhabitants into races. These characteristics were considered relatively permanent and transmissible, but it is head-form which has hitherto been accepted as the chief criterion of racial type, because it was considered to be the characteristic and least susceptible to the influence of environment. That certain physical changes result from modifications in Man's external conditions has been frequently observed, and a considerable body of statistical evidence is now available for its demonstration. It has been shown, for example, that the average height in Denmark has consistently risen from 165.42 cm. in the period 1852-56 to 169.11 cm. in 1904-05,* which it is suggested can be accounted for by the higher standard of living, the decline in the diseases affecting growth, and the smaller number of children in a family. Of this last factor investigations by Ewart† in

* Hansen, "Problems in Eugenics," p. 23.

† Ewart, "The Influence of Parental Age on Offspring," *Eugenics Review*, vol. iii.

an English manufacturing town reveal the close connection of height and weight with the frequency of child-birth: children born at a longer period than two years being on an average three inches taller and three pounds heavier than children born at a shorter interval, but it was maintained that head-form was inherited in a fairly pure fashion. The conclusions of Boas based on the statistical study of immigrants into America tend, however, to throw doubt upon the assumption of the pure and persistent inheritance of cranial index. "It would," he states, "be saying too much to claim that all the distinct European types become the same in America, without mixture, solely by the action of the new environment. First of all we have investigated only the effect of one environment, and we have every reason to believe that a number of distinct types are developing in America. . . . Although long-headed Sicilian becomes more round-headed in New York, and the round-headed Bohemian and Hebrew more long-headed, the approach to a uniform general type cannot be estab-

* Boas, "Changes in Immigrants."

lished because we do not yet know how long the changes continue and whether they would all lead to the same result." It must be said that the figures showing the variations in cephalic indices have been severely criticised on several grounds, one suggestion being, that the results are due to selection, and another, that little attention has been given to the fact that the range of individual variation within each racial group may be so large as to make an average in some cases meaningless.

The uncertainty on this matter is a good example of the state of our knowledge regarding many similar problems affecting Man. If any considerable plasticity of head-form can be established, and it is proved that under the influence of the same environment a population of mixed types in virtue of this plasticity tends towards uniformity, then obviously the value of physical anthropology for the elucidation of History would be largely destroyed. The fact is that before the problem is settled more exact evidence is necessary and much intensive investigation in relatively small areas on the persistence of type must be undertaken.

Another caution is necessary as to the interpretation of national character. Whatever may have been the evils wrought by the European War, it provided large numbers of people with an opportunity of becoming acquainted at first hand with the ways of life of the inhabitants of other countries, and those who gave consideration at all to the matter realised how easy it is to be misled in our reading of national character. It is of importance to remember that a portrayal of the character of another nation is not always the result of scientific analysis, but is oftentimes a caricature dependent for its features on the degree of amity or hatred existing at the time between the respective governments and peoples. It would indeed be tragic if a permanent estimate of the qualities of the German people were founded on the silly fabrications circulated by Press Bureaux to sustain the "morale" of non-combatants during the war. In national character, as in most other things, we see what our prejudices allow us to see. But granting the possibility of establishing the predominant racial types in the various

nations of Europe and also the possibility of a scientific analysis and description of each distinctive national "soul," should we find a sufficiently uniform correspondence between physical and cultural characteristics to warrant the formulation of a general theory?

It is not enough to narrow our investigation down to two or three nations; it must be extended to cover the whole of Europe. It is when this is done that the theory strikes us as inadequate, even though we confine our examination to modern times. After alleging the presence of a readiness to submit to authority in the French, Professor McDougall proceeds to note "that this tendency to seek personal leadership seems to be still strong among the Germans, among whom Alpine blood is even more strongly represented than in the French."* According to Ripley's maps, the population of the north, and particularly the north-west, is almost pure Nordic, the cephalic index being very little higher than it is in England, though it is true that the physical tests show that the inhabitants of the south of Germany are of

* "National Welfare and National Decay," p. 122.

the Alpine type. We should, therefore, according to Professor McDougall's theory of correlation, expect to find in Prussia a free and independent people, enjoying a relatively inactive Government, while in going south, we should expect to find the individual States becoming more and more autocratic, the population more and more docile and submissive, which, of course, is the exact opposite of the actual facts.

Take, again, the Swiss, and you will find that there are few nations of whom it can be said with less truth that they are submissive to strong centralised autocracy. This people's passion for independence is the key to its history and the cardinal feature of its present constitution. Vassalage of the type found under the feudal system in France and Germany never penetrated to all the valleys of the Alps, and many a remote commune never knew anything but a free peasantry. As far back as 1309 the cantons lying about the Lake of Lucerne won from the Emperor Henry VII the recognition of their freedom from all supremacy save that of the Empire itself. The mediæval democracies of the

various cantons, so enthusiastically eulogised by Freeman in the "English Constitution," with their recognition of strict equality in the right of voting—every man, whatever his wealth or rank, from the age of sixteen exercised the franchise—demonstrated the opposite of political slavishness. The process of federating the cantons, too, was slow and cautious, and the reservation by the people of direct control over their legislature, cantonal and federal, by means of initiative and referendum, is a distinctive feature of the Swiss constitution. Unfortunately for the race theorists the Swiss are almost purely Alpine, the type which should have yielded a different story altogether, since one of its characteristics is supposed to be submission to the ordering of their lives and destinies by an autocratic few.

The Irish, a nation in whom the Mediterranean type predominates, have also been singularly slow in answering the call of blood. Had they been loyal to their ancient lineage, what an easy task Dublin Castle would have had! The Poles, too, of whose struggles for independence our history books

give us such thrilling accounts, have belied their ancestry, for they were more than half Alpine, while the modern Greeks, who are almost a pure Mediterranean type, should be far less assertive and resentful of authority than they are.

Let us take a further test of the correlation of the physical and mental characteristics suggested by Professor McDougall—exploration and colonisation, which, he says, is pre-eminently the work of the restless, enterprising Nordic type. It is not enough to confine ourselves to the achievements in this respect of the British as against the French; we must extend the range of our investigation to cover other people predominantly Nordic, like the modern Scandinavians and the inhabitants of North Germany, who have not revealed the possession of a colonising spirit to any marked degree, and include in our survey the representatives of the other two European races who have shown as much intrepidity and enterprise as have the British.

Passing by the discovery by Dr. Rivers and Professor Elliot Smith of indications of colonising enterprises from early Egypt extending

to Oceania and even Peru, we know that in antiquity the Phœnicians and Carthaginians, peoples of purely Mediterranean stock, showed very considerable initiative and curiosity in their trading ventures, while later, in the great age of discovery, the Spanish and Portuguese established a long lead over the Nordic nations in the display of colonial energy and boldness. As early as 1500 King Emmanuel of Portugal had assumed the title of "Lord of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of India, Ethiopia, Arabia, and Persia," and from then the energy of the nation was concentrated on colonial expansion until the apparently sudden collapse, before the close of the century, of Portuguese power; a collapse, by the way, while attributable to a number of causes, was due in the main to the wholesale depopulation of the countryside for the exploitation of the newly discovered resources.

Further, if the theory of racial heredity is to be well established, it must be proved that the national differences not only exist now, but that they have shown themselves throughout the greater part of the history of the nations.

If any reader with the requisite time and knowledge were to undertake the study of parallel epochs in the case of only two nations, he would soon become convinced that whatever a people's hereditary mental endowment may be, there have been very striking changes manifested in the forms of its expression. He would find, for example, that this government-hating England was, in the Middle Ages, according to Maitland, "the most governable and the most governed country in Europe," whereas the French were exactly the reverse.

There is still one more point raised by Professor McDougall which ought to be discussed. It is "that the great condition of the decline of any civilisation is the inadequacy of the qualities of the people who are the bearers of it." He is referring to the phenomena familiarly known as the "cycles of civilisation," and which he prefers to call the "parabola of peoples," consisting in the successive rise and decline of the various civilisations which have appeared in different regions of the earth. Few historical phenomena have provoked such general speculation

as this. A once fashionable theory was that each of the several groups of mankind had a pre-ordained course to run; its span of life was pre-determined by some power outside itself. It was to have its day, make its contribution to humanity's store of knowledge and wisdom, and perish. A more intimate knowledge of the facts relating to the civilisations of the past has made historians, however, scout the inevitability of their decline and fall, though the more recent explanations have been hardly less fatalistic.

Professor Flinders Petrie, whose work on the "Revolutions of Civilisation" in his statement of the facts is so delightfully clear, when noting in a number of instances the cycle extended to approximately 1,800 years, advances a theory that every cycle begins through a blending of two races which gives to the resultant stock a new energy, which enables it to climb up the scale of civilisation, and after about 1,800 years the fresh vigour thus produced becomes exhausted and a period of decline inevitably sets in.

Professor McDougall, as we have indicated, gives to the decay of civilisation another

interpretation, which he summarises thus: "Every human being, and therefore every community of human beings, every populace, inherits from its ancestry a stock of innate qualities which enable it to enjoy, to sustain, to promote a civilisation of a certain degree of complexity. As civilisation advances, it makes greater and greater demands on these qualities, requires their exercise and development in ever fuller degree, until it approaches a point at which its complexity outruns the possibilities of the innate qualities. At the same time, it tends positively to impair those qualities, so that as the demands increase, the latent resources of human quality are diminished; therefore a time comes when the supply no longer equals the demand; that moment is the culminating point of that civilisation and of that people, the turning-point of the curve from which the downward plunge begins."* This theory suffers from the same defect as every other which aims at the statement of a single supreme cause of social phenomena. To be plausible it has to ignore so many facts.

* *Op. cit.*, pp. 40-41.

Now, the one fact common to all dead civilisations of the past is that they were overthrown or absorbed by military violence, for whatever deficiency had manifested itself in their innate qualities no case is known of a physically well-placed nation dying a physiological death. But to say that the fall of civilisation was due to a failure of its bearers to organise their military forces adequately for their defence would be rightly objected to on the ground that we are not tracing it back to its original causes. We would be told that we had still to explain why so many of the military states of antiquity that had revealed such striking prowess should have failed in the end, though to this a counter-objection might well be lodged that it does not necessarily follow that because a group of people is defeated militarily by force of numbers or superior fighting technique and is swallowed up into a less civilised horde it has proved itself decadent in respect of those mental and moral qualities on which the highest value should be placed. The way you define degeneracy depends upon your scale of values. But let us examine

Professor McDougall's application of his theory to Rome. To demonstrate how inadequate were the "innate" qualities of the Roman people to sustain the burden of civilisation which we assume he would claim to be the creation and expression of those same qualities, he points out their incapacity to utilise properly their leisure. "The circus, the combat of gladiators and wild beasts, and chariot races became the passionate delight of the multitude."* The many forms of luxury which became easily accessible, and the indulgence they encouraged, caused men to become enervated, and therefore, when the testing time came they were found lacking in the necessary virtues; but the question for the sociologist is, Why did this dry rot set in? Professor McDougall, in the same paragraph, supplies an important part in the answer: "Many men under simpler conditions would have lived solid, useful and happy lives." In other words, their habits were largely the product of the conditions under which they were forced to live.

To interpret rightly the decline of Roman

* *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

civilisation* we require a knowledge of all the internal and external conditions. It is not enough merely to indicate the existence of the particular evils which sap the vitality of the State. It must surely be of importance to remember that the political organisation was such "that there was no means of attempting to cure them by any effort of the human will." Before we can justly conclude that the innate resources of the people had been exhausted consideration must be given to the fact of the "fatal absence of any non-revolutionary means of reform. From first to last, good intentions on the part of individuals were nugatory for lack of an organ through which they could find effect," † and in this absence of a political instrument capable at once of encouraging the growth of, and giving expression to, a healthy public opinion and of effecting continuous and peaceful reform will be found a potent cause of the decline and fall of Rome. How intimately connected with the economic factors are the social evils

* The facts used in this discussion have been borrowed largely from Heitland, "The Roman Fate."

† *Op. cit.*, pp. 38, 39.

which undermined the virility of the Roman people, and led to what has been called "race suicide," is made abundantly clear in Mr. Heitland's illuminating essay. He shows how important a factor in strengthening the hold of Rome on its acquired territories during its early expansion in Italy was the settlement on confiscated lands of farmer citizens, either as owners or cultivators, and how this structure based on agriculture, though severely tested in wars, revealed itself to be effective and strong, but after the devastation of large tracts of arable land in Italy in the second Punic War two processes set in.

Land was in the market at low prices and slaves were plentiful and fairly cheap, so men with money bought both, formed large estates and worked them for profit by slave labour. The small owners who had cultivated their own farms did not after the war return to their ploughs; some because they were actually driven to abandon their holdings, others preferred to continue as soldiers, but many drifted into Rome, where, owing to the absence of employment, progressive degrada-

tion followed. "Eking out a precarious livelihood by the sale of their votes and general dependence on the bounty of the rich, they became a parasitic rabble. Courted by candidates for office, their perquisites grew: in time they were even fed by doles of corn provided by the State below cost price." Economic conditions later became still more unfavourable to the existence of a class of peasant proprietors through the importation of cheap grain, and landed estates were devoted to the cultivation of the vine and the olive. That the decay and disappearance of the yeoman class was a serious evil was realised clearly enough by the wisest men in the State. But political power was steadily passing into the hands of the men who profited by the new agricultural system, and so the agricultural capitalists succeeded in stifling the efforts of the Gracchi to restore the yeomen by limiting the size of the larger holdings and allotting the rest of the public lands in smaller holdings among the poorer citizens; and this triumph of the economically ascendant class can be regarded as the beginning of the Civil Wars, which ended in the

destruction of freedom and the establishment of the despotism of the Empire. With expansion had come opportunities of exploitation in the acquired provinces, and there followed a great rush of Roman citizens abroad to secure the profits so easily obtained when the might of Rome was at their back. Many returned to Rome as men of means, and there was here no lack of opportunity for utilising their capital. At first their main preoccupation was to oppose the ruling nobility, but eventually, as was to be expected, a coalition was effected which created a solid party representing property. This party being also deeply interested financially in the slave trade, it need not cause wonder that the efforts to restore free peasants to the land were vain. And so we find in Italy slavery becoming more and more the basis of civilisation, and the enjoyment of ease and luxury, the fruit of wealth wrung from servile labour, becoming characteristic of the Romans there. What opportunities had existed under the Republic for political service to absorb man's energies had ceased. A man who wanted to be somebody, however,

had the opportunity in the provinces, and the more virile and enterprising went and settled there. Meanwhile, protected by the sword of barbarian armies the miscegenation of the races was producing a people little conscious of any national feeling and tradition. "Wealth was now the only distinction between man and man. How to gain it, to keep it, to make it go as far as possible, was the remaining ambition; and under Roman rule the wealthy were everywhere in power and made full use of their opportunities of such a state of things. Race-suicide (if we can speak of race in this connection) and legacy-hunting were common phenomena. But they did not appear suddenly out of nothing, they were effects of the past. Of the palsied impotence that brought about the fall of the Empire, they were contributory causes."*

In a matter of this kind, to dogmatise would be folly, but a survey of all the facts does seem to reveal that the phenomena described by Professor McDougall were not the result of a failure of the innate qualities

* "The Roman Fate," p. 75.

of the people, but rather of the absence of opportunities for their full exercise. A people whose chief outlet of social activity was in the too easy acquisition of wealth was bound sooner or later to pay the penalty. It is not astonishing that the time came when "to be poor was not merely the sorest disgrace and the worst crime, but the only disgrace and the only crime. . . . Men had forgotten what honesty was. A person who refused a bribe was regarded not as an upright man, but as a personal foe."* The sickness of Rome was the "sickness of an acquisitive society."

It is doubtless true that the advance in civilisation makes demands on those to whom its gifts fall for their best utilisation, but whether they use them well is determined by the degree of control they have over them. Scientific achievement has placed in our hands limitless resources, but whether they are to be used for the enrichment of life or for the impoverishment and ultimate destruction of civilisation itself depends on whether vision and a sense of service or a materialistic acquisitiveness will be the ruling principles of

* Mommsen, "History of Rome," vol. v., p. 39.

those who hold charge of our national destiny. Since to most of us the motives we are trained to exercise in our economic activities become the keynotes of the whole of our moral life the ideas and principles which are embodied in our industrial organisation become a matter of first-rate sociological importance.

The position, then, would seem to be this. As far as the nations of Europe are concerned, the facts seem to prove conclusively the inadequacy of the theory which seeks to make the inheritance of innate racial qualities the sole cause of variation in national characteristics. The actual strength of the racial factor probably can never be known, and certainly all attempts to isolate it and trace its working have failed. At present, at any rate, its influence as a factor in the development of national character and institutions cannot be taken into account for any serious practical purposes. On the other hand, a general view of the history of any group of people does not enable us to discover any comprehensive phrase which can portray the "national character" as something definite and typical of all epochs. It changes with

changing circumstances. Just as it is true of human beings that instincts and tendencies, while largely hereditary, manifest themselves in very different ways according to circumstances together with the experience of the individual or the social traditions under which he grows up, so it is with groups of people or nations. If there are common hereditary qualities, the manner of their activity is determined by the environment in and through which they must work, by the national traditions and conventions, by the dominating religious ideas of the period, by the economic and political structure of society and so forth. To this there is an obvious corollary.

National character is not something immutable. This is as false a dogma as is the statement that human nature is immutable. Just as the latter is moulded by the world in which it grows up, so does national character change with the changing life of the people. The practical significance of this truth is of vital importance, for it gives us one key with which we can get at human nature. We cannot yet, with our inadequate knowledge

of heredity, use that approach, but we can determine the kind of influence which shall operate in order to help to produce the type of character which the lessons of history and experience tell us is the type whose survival should be most desired.

DIFFERENCES of opinion as to the nature of a phenomenon do not annihilate the phenomenon itself. Nationality is a stubborn fact; it has to be accounted for and reckoned with. It is a crude Internationalism that ignores it, and a foolish Imperialism that overrides it.

There is in all men a fundamental and spontaneous impulse to association, but this impulse asserts itself in response to a variety of stimuli. Kinship, economic and cultural interests, community of religious views, common concern in the attainment of a political or social end, are all obvious and in a sense utilitarian, but nationality as a binding influence in society has a subtlety and elusiveness which make definition difficult. This is due mainly to the fact that the causes of nationality do not lie on the surface, but have springs deep down in human nature.

Nationality is the rationalisation of certain primitive instincts and impulses resulting in

a particular attitude of mind; it is a consciousness, a belief, and an ideal. That nationality is not founded on race is exemplified by the Welsh, in whom national sentiment is real and strong. The researches of Professor Fleure and Dr. T. C. James* reveal the persistence in Wales of a number of ethnic types. It seems that on the Neolithic foundation have been superimposed the Beaker-Maker type in Merionethshire; the dark broad-heads along the west coast and in parts of Glamorgan, Carmarthen, and Pembrokeshire; the medium to broad-headed fair Brythonic stock in Powys; the Nordic types in the estuarine lands. Neither can the Scottish people boast of racial homogeneity; and Germany also is a racial medley though having a community of language. Indeed, it is doubtful whether in the ethnographic sense any nation is pure, and clearly, with the development of transport facilities stimulating an intermingling of peoples, whatever degree of purity did exist is fast disappearing.

Of the later developed countries, the

* The *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, vol. xlvi.

Americans generally leave little room for doubt as to whether their people are a nation, though the vast diversity of racial constituents is beyond question. Difference of language is an important distinction between civilised nations, yet a nation is not necessarily a group of people speaking the same tongue. The Swiss, for example, are made up of French, German, Italian, and Romansch-speaking elements welded together in the struggle for liberty against the Hapsburgs, while more than one historical instance can be found of a people adopting a new language without losing their consciousness of nationhood. The Irish are a near and familiar example. Nevertheless, the existence of a distinctive language is bound to intensify the sense of national individuality and separateness, and its persistence is always looked upon as the symbol of a robust nationalism. It is this which explains the attempts of the Tsarist Government of Russia to suppress the Lithuanian, Esthonian and Latvian languages, and the former German suppression of Polish in Posen and of Danish in Schleswig, while the importance

of a distinct tongue in the maintenance of national life is illustrated most strikingly by the example of Czecho-Slovakia. From the disastrous defeat of the Czechs at the battle of the White Mountain in 1620 up to the nineteenth century Czech national life was extinguished. But early in the century came the successful efforts to revive an almost forgotten language. After 1867 Bohemian literature and art made tremendous strides, giving birth to a strong agitation to make the Czech language the dominant tongue in the schools and government institutions. In the struggle of the Slavs against the Germans and Magyars, this became a supreme issue, and it laid the foundations of a national movement which culminated in the emergence out of the European War of Czecho-Slovakia as a sovereign State.

If, as we hope, in the cases of both the older and the resurrected nations, an insistence on distinctiveness of intellectual and moral attainments as the chief justification for the persistence of nationality becomes widely accepted, then the retention or revival of a national tongue is likely to become an

important feature of the policy and cultural activity of the future.

Discussions of the phenomenon of nationality generally consist of little more than a recital of its manifestations in historical events. The fact of the existence of coherent groups of people occupying a definite territory, conscious of a common thought and feeling which is in a measure distinctive, and maintaining a social life in some instances expressed in a complex of institutions called a State, is not questioned. Neither is the fact to be denied that these groups, in virtue of national sentiment and through a perception of common interests, have been a potent factor in determining the course of the world's history. It is because of the potency of nationality as a force in the historical process that it challenges examination, and if the future of mankind is to be guided by a broad philosophic view of the laws of human society and human nature, a scientific study of nationality as a social phenomenon becomes a vital necessity.

The passion of patriotism has yielded two crops. It has often inspired a lofty and

unflinching devotion to duty, sacrificial service to the community in many fields of constructive activity, and has helped to develop in men a capacity to rise at times above their own greeds and interests to a high level of selflessness and nobility. But from it also have sprung the national jealousies, rivalries and hatreds which precipitated the European War and which may, unless reason assumes control, destroy the economic and moral structure of civilisation. What, then, is nationality?

As we saw in an earlier chapter, the most common characteristic of animistic belief was the conviction that the spirits of dead ancestors had much to do with the fortunes or misfortunes of their living descendants. Passing into a deity, the dead chief continued to protect his family and to receive from it suit and service as of old; he still held his authority by helping friends and harming enemies. In the Roman household it was the solemn preoccupation of the male descendants to offer food and sacrifice to the friendly ancestral ghosts and to keep alight the hearth fire which cooked the offerings.

Indeed, to an ancient, no fate was more dreadful than the lack of such care and tendance, and a Roman, like the Hindu, in case he was childless, adopted a male child whose duty would be, as if he were a son, to keep up the family sacra. The importance of ancestor-worship lies in its provision of a basis for the expansion of the blood-related family. A man could only share in house, tribe, and state so long as he was descended from particular ancestors and eponymous heroes; and due cult of these illustrious dead was the condition of his enjoying any rights or inheriting property. But if society was to grow a way had to be found for the admission into the original consanguineous group of men of alien descent. A basis for adoption was provided by the worship and commemoration of ancestors. Participation by one born outside the family became tantamount to creating a blood-tie, for common worship made all the celebrants of one flesh. This adoption of common deities made possible the gradual evolution from societies held together by blood-kinship to societies consolidated on other bases, especially on the basis of local contiguity.

With the recognition of a common divinity would come the acknowledgment of the authority of that divinity's earthly representative—the chief, obedience to the divinely sanctioned laws of the community, pride in its traditions and achievements and a willingness to share in its hatred. Once an artificial method of securing kinship had developed, whether it was through manes-worship as in Rome, or by joining a kindred in the work of avenging the death of a kinsman as in the case of the Welsh tribes, the operation of the mental characteristic in men, known as gregariousness, which gives a kind of instinctive sanction to the opinions, rules, and ideas developed in a group would intensify the sense of communal oneness and bring cohesion. In the primitive community, as we have already seen, the individual was of little account. The principal fact governing group relations and group property was the continuity of group organisation at the cost of curtailing individual tendencies. Persons with definite rights as individuals are a comparatively late development. What mattered was the safety and well-being of the com-

munity as a community, and the test of an act's rightness or wrongness was its social consequences. This was the moral law inculcated by tradition and observed by the majority of men. If all this is true, is it not possible to discern in tribal consciousness the basic elements of nationality—illusion of a common origin, proneness to herd suggestion resulting in an irrational, unquestioning acceptance of the herd's ideas, prejudices and rancours, pride in the achievements of heroes, distrust of neighbours and so forth? Are they not both manifestations of the same mental make-up of Man? When economic and political development had made group self-sufficiency and autonomy impossible, and welded the smaller aggregates into a single whole, would not the same herd instinct, with all that it connotes, once it had adjusted itself to the new conditions, assert itself as of old, but over a wider field? Is not the difference between enthusiasm for the tribe and enthusiasm for the nation merely a matter of the size and character of the herd? Your answer will depend largely upon the nationalists you have met and upon whether

you examine the phenomenon of nationality in time of peace or of war.

While it is necessary to guard against a tendency to view social life as a mere balance of instincts, and not as a synthesis in which many of the original instincts have been transformed in accordance with the intelligence and experience of men, it must be conceded that men vary considerably in the degree of rationality which is brought to bear in determining their conduct. There are millions of adults who for ever live the political life of the schoolboy and seem quite incapable of any large or deep view of human affairs; and who for justification of their enthusiasm for country will point to its numbers, its territory, its military and naval achievements. Such rhetorical blustering as theirs must often have been heard long ago when their ancestors, flushed with victory and laden with loot, sent up their prayers of thanksgiving to the gods of homestead and tribe. The supreme gift of reason is to see the difference between bigness and greatness. "Jingoism" is a herd prejudice which has undergone no sublimation.

The irrationality which constitutes the patriotism of so many is never completely absent in the national feeling of those men of fuller mind who believe they have found for it an intellectual and moral basis. No clearer demonstration of this is necessary than the way in which for a time leaders of thought in the various belligerent countries completely lost their heads during the "Great" War. They, too, found it impossible to resist the impulse to be at one with the herd, to share its hatreds and angers, to believe everything it believed. That erudition and scientific training are not a safeguard against suggestibility was most painfully demonstrated in the speeches and actions of those who might have been expected to have their primitive impulses safely chained up. This stripping-off during the war of the respectable garments with which herd instinct had been covered revealed the essential and basic psychological element in nationality, just as times of stress and uncontrol show other unsuspected mental attitudes to have savage instincts as their core. Once it is realised that there exists a spon-

taneous disposition in all men toward group association and to accept unquestioningly the conventions, thoughts, and ideals of the group to which they belong, nationality as a social phenomenon becomes understandable and some of its characteristics appear inevitable. The "rise of Nationalism" was not the introduction of an entirely new quality into the human mind. It meant only that among those peoples who awoke into national consciousness the work of the forces which had steadily operated in breaking down group self-sufficiency and autonomy had at last resulted in making the nation the herd. "Tudor nationalism" in England, for example, can only be understood when we remember that it was the culmination of the many factors which had been constantly at work during the preceding centuries removing local isolation and exclusiveness and consolidating the nation as an economic and political unit. Beginning with William the Conqueror's attempt to weld the several parts of England into a united whole by forcing each of the local powers into attachment to himself as the common head of the realm,

we see at a later stage the disintegration of the manorial system together with the growth of a consciousness among peasants over wide areas of a community of interests in relation to the enforcement by statute of common conditions of labour. How real it was events following the Black Death proved. The growth of internal commerce, the commingling of people in the towns, the unifying influence of the Church all tended to expand the Englishman's social horizon. So we see from the Edwardian period onwards the gradual supersession of local institutions by Parliament through the development of national industrial and commercial regulation, till by the time of Elizabeth a well-articulated system of national economy had been built up.

Once the community had been organised into one body politic recognising a central authority and the people made conscious of common economic interests, all that was necessary to ensure an outburst of patriotism was the menace of a foreign invasion, which may always be guaranteed to prove an effective stimulant to a nascent or declining national spirit.

Despite the depressing outlook in some directions to-day, if we glance back at the influence of these forces in expanding Man's social horizon and the range of his sympathies, we may find hope. With ourselves, from the family-clan to the tribe, from the tribe to an amalgamation of tribes, from the group of tribes to England, from England to Britain, then to a Greater Britain, and finally to an Empire with its medley of races, religions, and languages, loyalty and willingness to sacrifice have grown and spread. If they have expanded thus far, why not yet farther to include the whole Commonwealth of Man? In the fact that a perception of the economic oneness of the country provided a basis for the enlargement of the passion for the tribe to a passion for the nation we can find some encouragement for the future. The realisation of the interdependence of nations for the necessities and comforts of life—a lesson brought home to the majority of people during and since the war—has already stimulated an interest and an understanding of foreign relations which are hopeful. It may be that the conception of the world's economic one-

ness may provide the nucleus around which will grow a fuller conception of the spiritual unity of mankind and a passion to embody this vision in an objective organisation which shall be not a League of Nations but a League of Humanity. But however piously we may hope for the larger view, we must not fail to recognise the power of irrationality in the guidance of Man's conduct, for instinct is still more potent than reason. We don't realise this because most of us act instinctively first, and only afterwards do we use our reason to explain and justify what we have done. As we have explained before, it is of little use to blame human suggestibility. It is part and parcel of the gregariousness which makes social life at all possible. It is better to recognise frankly that for the present it is a characteristic of Man's nature to accept unquestioningly the opinions which come from whatever sources he deems authoritative and for us to act accordingly. There is perhaps a tendency to-day to dwell over-much on the popular mind's susceptibility to the baser passions, to suspicions, to fear, to hate, and so forth; but time and again it

has been demonstrated that in every people there is a sense of justice, an instinctive passion for right, a capacity for "sacred rage."

Suggestibility must be used to spread the thoughts and ideals which are founded on reason and a nobler ethic. The destinies of mankind are shaped not only by the policies of governments, but also by the slow, invisible changes ever going on in the mental and moral outlook of all the individuals of a community. The future, therefore, is largely in the hands of the Teachers, the Press, and the Churches, for these are the sources from which most people derive their new ideas, and it is to them we must look for the creation of a saner attitude, finer and wider ideals in the minds of men, and of a sustained spiritual passion which will transcend prejudice of race and the acquisitiveness nurtured by a competitive life.

The world can afford to tolerate nationality only when it is based on a rational perception of the advantages of a coherent group life as an aid to intellectual and moral development. It is safe only as a means; as an end

in itself it becomes a menace. The lesson of History and experience is emphatic. Nationality expressing itself culturally can enrich the world; economically, impoverish it; militarily, destroy it.

*Chapter VI The Economic Organisation of
Society*

BY far the greater part of Man's social activity is that which concerns itself with the satisfaction of his physical wants. The briefest reflection on the production of any simple commodity meant to satisfy a simple human want will open our eyes to the wonderful way in which the people of the whole civilised world now co-operate in the production of wealth, and will reveal to us a widely-ramified, complex, but coherent organisation, which in spite of occasional failures here and there does its work with extraordinary regularity. To provide with a breakfast those of us who are town-dwellers and industrial workers and who cannot grow anything for our own consumption, world-wide activities and efforts have been involved. Canada, Denmark, India, China, Jamaica, Seville, and Wiltshire have all been laid under tribute, while the engineer, the navigator, the miner, the tin-plate worker, the

boiler-maker, the chartering clerk and the banker are but a few of the host who have made the meal possible. If we were to examine a little more closely this tremendous machine which provides the commodities necessary to satisfy the wants of the world's population, we should find that it is not the creation of one mind, that it is not driven and controlled by a single master-brain, yet there are few who would not be amazed to find no breakfast forthcoming some morning. Those who would have to miss it would not do so because there was not enough food to go round, but simply because they had not been allowed to claim their share by taking part in helping to provide satisfaction for others of men's wants.

If the regular working of this world-machine for producing goods is not due to the control of any one individual, what then is the power which drives it? The answer of course is "self-interest." Commodities are produced in the localities where they can be most easily grown or manufactured, and taken to where they are most wanted because it pays. Canada produces wheat and timber and

sends them to Britain; Britain produces coal, machinery, and woollen goods and sends them to Canada; Jamaica sends us sugar, and we send in return cotton goods, not out of unselfish regard for other people's needs, but because it is in the interest of all concerned that it should be so. Countries concentrate on certain forms of economic activity; people specialise in different occupations, and do so in greater or less numbers as the demand for different products increases or decreases; they congregate in large numbers on spots where it is desirable they should work, and others keep away, all because it pays to do it. To satisfy our own wants and the wants of those dependent on us is the urgent motive of economic life, and to do so in such a way as to yield maximum results with a minimum of effort is the function of economic organisation. Whether or not a greater supply of the things wanted and a greater measure of happiness to those engaged in the production thereof might accrue from the substitution for self-interest or hope of gain as the ruling motive, of a rational perception of the need for specialised

economic activity or of a universal and sustained sense of service, does not concern us here. We are discussing the existing organisation for satisfying human wants and the impulses of which it is an expression, and of it we can say that what keeps it together, provides channels that its products may flow in the directions where they are most needed, thus making it possible for localities and individuals to make the fullest use of natural resources and special aptitudes, is men's universal anxiety to do that which pays them best. Since the middle of the eighteenth century, through the operation of this motive and as the result of a conjunction of historical forces, separate industries and businesses have been organised on a large scale by an employer or company of employers who, in virtue of owning or controlling an accumulation of wealth can acquire raw materials, tools, and other requisite instruments of production known as capital, hire labour and direct the sale of the commodities produced, so as to yield a profit on their outlay. The system is known as Capitalism.

Before this kind of organisation became possible to any great extent certain essential conditions had to be established.* Before capitalism could develop on an extensive scale wealth had first to be produced in such quantities as to provide a surplus over and above what could be immediately consumed by its owners, and converted into a form in which it could be saved and later used by those having the desire and capacity to apply it to profit-making. But without the existence of a large class who had lost their grip on the means of earning an independent livelihood by working in their own homes and workshops, on materials which they themselves had bought or otherwise obtained, and disposing of the finished product to their own advantage, no development of a factory system on any considerable scale would have been possible. But when, further, the utilisation of mechanical power made machine production by group labour possible and profitable and large markets for its out-

* This part of the discussion will reveal an indebtedness to Mr. J. A. Hobson's "Evolution of Modern Capitalism."

put became available, all the conditions essential for the wide and general development of capitalism were present.

In Western Europe we do not find more than a partial conjunction of all the conditions until the eighteenth century, although the existence together of certain of these factors did at the close of the Middle Ages give rise to the development of capitalist enterprise in commerce; while it would seem that the tendency to organise manufacture on a capitalist basis manifested itself at an early date in certain of the Italian cities, and proceeded as far as it was possible under the circumstances prevailing.

As for England, were it possible to take a comprehensive bird's-eye view of its changing economic life from Norman times onward it would be seen that the whole trend of its development was toward establishing the conditions which made the Industrial Revolution inevitable. We should see several streams not entirely independent of each other coursing their way down the years to a point at which they all converged.

Under a natural economy in a feudal

structure we discover the maintenance of king and feudal superior out of the product of labour upon the land surplus to what is requisite for the maintenance of labourers, this surplus accruing to them by feudal right. Here we find the historical foundation of capitalism, the ownership of land placing the means of appropriating the surplus in hands other than those of its producers. Its monetisation does not alter the fact, though it may cloud our perception of it. The introduction of a money economy was necessary for the most successful exploitation of the feudal system. It seems obvious that from the standpoint of the lords who wished to possess accumulations of wealth for various purposes that payments in money of taxes, tolls, and rents, etc., would be more convenient than payments in kind, and so we find William I. anxious to organise his revenues on a monetary basis, inducing some Jews to accompany him to England to aid the process. The king desired command of money, but the wealth of his subjects consisted of land and goods, so the Jewish financiers had to be called upon to make advances in money while the taxes

were being collected in kind and realised, or, as happened at times, the Jews would lend to the taxpayer so that the royal demands might be met in coin. This was also the case with the Papal revenue. The Popes had created throughout Christendom an immense fiscal system of obtaining through it a large revenue which would have been impossible to administer had it been taken in kind. Its collection through the agency of the "Pope's merchants" laid the foundation of the Florentine banking business which at one period in the Middle Ages controlled the financial world of the time. Here, then, is the first fact, that the surplus product of labour upon the land was appropriated in the form of taxes, tolls, and rents by those who had established a feudal claim to it.

But by kings, nobles, and ecclesiastical bodies, this surplus was either consumed in luxury or accumulated as treasure, and was therefore not available to be used in organising business for the making of profit. So we come to the next series of tendencies which comprise much of the economic history of the Middle Ages, and concerned with the

transference of the ownership of capital from the owners of land to business men, and we find the financier gradually strengthening his grip on the economic resources of this and other countries. Cunningham calls attention, for example, to important changes in the organisation of military enterprises in Europe during the Middle Ages whereby through the intervention of money-lenders the hiring of mercenary troops in place of feudal levies became possible. Money was advanced on the security of taxes or parliamentary supplies, and the system was obviously convenient to the borrower and probably very lucrative to the lender. Then, resulting from the Crusades, apart from the borrowing necessary to meet initial expenses the absence of the landowners increased the powers of a class of business officials who managed the estates, while the development of costly habits of life led the returned Crusaders into further extravagance and placed them more completely in the hands of the financiers.

This gradual transference of wealth into the hands of business men does not alone explain the accumulations necessary for the growth

of capitalism, and the slow development of joint-stock enterprise is in this connection very significant. Within the country a few early undertakings such as the development of mines had been placed on a joint-stock principle, but it was not until 1553 that the first joint-stock company was formed for overseas trade—the Company of Merchant Adventurers for the exploitation of the Russian trade. Its first application was, however, somewhat timorous, for it was limited to each separate voyage and the profits were divided after every trip in proportion to the investment.

This example was followed by others, and was the method adopted in the initial stages by the East India Company. This slowness in the adoption and the extension of the joint-stock principle in England would seem to indicate the inadequacy of the accumulations of money which could enable capitalism to exist in its modern dimensions. But at the close of the Middle Ages there developed in Europe a policy known as the Mercantile System, based on a belief in the importance of every nation possessing a large supply of

the precious metals. To attain this end, foreign trade was exalted over domestic trade and State action employed to encourage artificially its extension. With the discovery of the New World and its exploitation through military plunder, unequal trade and slave labour, a large development of the European currencies took place; money economy became extensively developed and circulation more rapid. With the growth of great States large permanent armies became necessary, and since manufactures would make possible a denser population than agriculture, it became the preoccupation of governments to foster them. The growth of manufactures reacted on commerce to which a new and extensive field had been opened by the establishment of colonies, and nothing shows more clearly the principles underlying mercantilism than the methods of colonial trade. For a long period the colonies were looked upon simply as new sources of public revenue. They were treated as estates to be worked only for the advantage of the parent countries by whom they were forbidden to trade with other European

nations, or to compete with home manufactures. Their function was to supply either the precious metals or raw materials in exchange for the finished products of industry. Side by side with these developments we find another of the essential conditions maturing in the growth of a large proletariat. After the thirteenth century the manorial system began to break up and serfdom to decline. It is clear that tenants could only be released from their labour-dues after other labour-power had become available, and there is evidence that at the end of the thirteenth century an increasing population had already begun to create a reservoir of surplus labour from which it could be drawn. Miss Davenport, in "The Economic Development of a Norfolk Manor," shows that on the manor of Forncett between 1270 and 1307 there were about a hundred persons who were not tenants, most of whom were presumably available for hire, while the clearing of woods and the conversion of wastes and commons to meet the increased demand for new settlements proceeded so far that legislation became necessary in the

interests of the former tenants who were being deprived of their pasture. Again, a large number of serfs became free either by manumission or as the result of purchase. In many instances they were allowed to leave the manors on the condition that they recognised their feudal obligations by paying a nominal poll-tax, which was tantamount to an admission of the lord's right to recall them. Few, however, were recalled and the payment of the tax was allowed to lapse. As might be imagined, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries serfs commonly resorted to flight to the towns as a means of securing freedom. Such an acceleration of this process of liberation followed the ravages of the Black Death, so that before the end of the fifteenth century the mass of the English rural population had emerged from the servile status, and in the sixteenth century, with the exception of isolated survivals, serfdom had disappeared. Meanwhile, inevitable changes were taking place in the internal economy of the manor. With the increased circulation of money and the rise of a free labouring class, the demesne had

come to be cultivated by hired workers, but following the Plague, labour for this purpose became very scarce and wages rose. Under the new circumstances the lord found it more convenient either to lease his demesne to a single tenant as one large holding, or to divide it up and rent it to a number of tenants. This resulted in the growth of inequality of holdings. In many manors strips were being consolidated into compact areas marked off by hedges. A market in land also developed, and many tenants began to show commercial enterprise in enlarging their holdings by purchasing those of other tenants, and concentrating the whole into one "farm." The disintegration of the old agrarian system would have proceeded, though perhaps slowly, without the intervention of the increased demand for wool from Flanders and other countries, and from the rise of woollen manufacture in England, but the stimulus this gave to sheep-raising greatly accelerated it. With the greater profitableness of wool-production came the readjustment of the manor involving the conversion of arable into pasture land and the occupation of the waste

with a resultant diminution or destruction of common rights thereon. Fields were laid out and fenced in for sheep-grazing. On some manors only open pastures, meadows, and wastes were enclosed, but more frequently the adaptation to the new conditions involved a consolidation of the arable strips. These various developments constituted what is known as the Enclosure Movement. Enclosure, beginning as early as the thirteenth century, had a different significance for different parts of the country; in some cases the changes meant the loss to the customary tenants of their rights in the pasture and waste, and this was a serious hardship enough, but in others it necessitated the partial or complete eviction of some of the villagers, more particularly of those whose tenure for various reasons was specially insecure. These dispossessed tenants became landless wage-earners, and often were reduced to destitution and vagabondage. The acceleration of the process in the sixteenth century was in a large measure responsible for the poverty, disorder and crime which led to the Poor Law Act of 1601. Rioting and destruc-

tion of hedges became common, and the feelings of those most affected by the procedure found expression in the Pilgrimage of Grace (1536), the rising under Kett (1549), and the insurrection in Buckinghamshire (1552). In the seventeenth century the tendency to enclosure diminished considerably, though it did not altogether cease. A combination of social, economic and technical factors, however, were at work which resulted in a widespread and systematic movement during the period between about 1760 and 1840.

Apart from enclosure by common consent, which was probably going on continuously from the fifteenth century, the chief method employed during this later movement was the passing of private Acts of Parliament. During the reign of George III 3,554 such Acts were passed, and at its end 5,686,400 acres had been enclosed.

Up to the middle of the eighteenth century the economic unit of the nation was the country village, which was not so exclusively agricultural as it became later. In the villages most of the staple manufactures were

carried on, the products, as in the case of the woollen industry, being collected by merchants with their trains of pack-horses. Conditions varied, but in most unenclosed villages the normal labourer did not depend on his wages alone. Spinning was undertaken by the women and children working in the cottages, and the weaving was carried on oftentimes after their day's work in the fields, though in some parts, especially in Yorkshire, there were weavers whose interest in agriculture was confined to the cultivation of their own gardens. Still in the village agriculture was the basic occupation, each seeking to provide subsistence for all its residents, and although the methods of using the soil were wasteful, it was still possible in 1765 to export corn abroad. During the latter half of the century a vast increase in population occurred, and a "subsistence agriculture" became quite inadequate. An improvement in methods, therefore, was imperative to meet the enormously increased demand for foodstuffs; a task rendered more necessary by the exclusion of England from markets abroad, owing to foreign wars, and

especially the Continental War that lasted from 1795 to 1815.

The three classes in the village who stood to gain by enclosure were the lord of the manor, the tithe-owner, and the large farmer. The other classes were bound to suffer. The small farmer who could not shoulder the expenditure involved by the legal and other costs "either emigrated to America or to an industrial town, or became a day labourer."* Of the cottager it has been said that "before the enclosure the cottager was a labourer with land, after enclosure he was a labourer without land. The economic basis of his independence was destroyed."†

In addition to these the little officials of the village court were also scattered by enclosure. "History has drawn a curtain over those days of exile and suffering, when cottages were pulled down as if by an invader's hand, and families that had lived for centuries in their dales or on their small farms and commons were driven before the torrent. . . . The enclosures created a new organisation of

* Hammond, "The Village Labourer," p. 98.

† *Loc. cit.*

classes. The peasant with rights and a status, with a share in the fortunes and government of his village, standing in rags, but standing on his feet, makes way for the labourer with no corporate rights to defend, no corporate power to invoke, no property to cherish, no ambition to pursue, bent beneath the fear of his masters and the weight of a future without hope."

Thus was created the nucleus which grew into the horde that had no alternative but to submit to the regimentation of factory life, when the discovery of a new motive power to work the inventions of such men as Hargreaves, Arkwright, Crompton, and Cartwright called large-scale production into being on an extensive scale, first in the cotton and later in the woollen industry. At first, though only for a comparatively short period, water was the motive force, but in 1785 steam-power was first introduced into a cotton factory in Nottinghamshire. With the development and utilisation of steam-driven machinery coal-mining rapidly developed into the key-industry, and the obvious advantage of erecting factories in

close proximity to coal supplies resulted in a general redistribution of population.

The South-Western and the Eastern counties ceased to be what they had been in previous centuries, the homes of a large manufacturing population mainly working in their cottages, for there was no coal there. We therefore see a shifting of population from south to north, to the cotton and woollen mills of Lancashire and the West Riding of Yorkshire, to the pottery and hardware centres of Staffordshire and Warwickshire. Not only was there this migration northwards, but also, as might be expected, a greater concentration in the towns. It would be wrong to assume that all the events covered by the designation of the Industrial Revolution were altogether sudden in their emergence. Factory organisation was not unknown in England previously, while in the manufacture of several commodities the independence of the workers had been declining for a long time through a tendency to rely on capitalist merchants for the marketing of their products and for the supply of raw materials. As early as the seventeenth century the middle-

man is found describing himself as a manufacturer. The workman, however, still continued to work with his own tools in his own home, though in 1750, in the stocking trade for example, the weaver while working in his own home received from the merchant not only his material but the frames used for weaving. Long before steam-power the advantage which the merchants had in their control over raw materials had led to the establishment in the textile industries of small factories employing in some cases 150 workers. Thus, the type of organisation we now know was gradually being built up as opportunity offered itself, and the acceleration of the process in the Industrial Revolution was due to a completer conjunction of the requisite conditions. Once the system began to operate it produced in still larger measure those conditions necessary to its successful development, mainly through the stimulus it gave to the rapid growth of population. For the vast bulk of the people there was no longer any possibility of personal ownership of the instruments of production, and for them, therefore, there was no alterna-

tive but to become wage-earners, depending for their subsistence, security, and freedom on the will of a relatively small class of employers.

Further, their economic helplessness was intensified by the monopoly of political power enjoyed by their masters. To the oligarchy which wielded authority in the State the chief concern of government was the safeguarding of property; human life counted for nothing. The conception of the State as the instrument of society for ensuring the conditions which shall enable all its citizens to realise and express the best that is in them would have been deemed rank sedition. The business of the working man was to be industrious and obedient to him who paid his meagre wage, and to be satisfied with the station of life in which it had pleased his God to place him. In the eyes of his rulers his only value was that which a slave owner attaches to his slave, just an instrument in the production of riches. The new industry, holding as it did such vast possibilities for the enrichment of life, became the chief agent in its degradation. Machinery instead of serving Man became his master.

That capitalism has yielded a tremendous advance in material civilisation for a greatly increased population is not because those persons who developed it were actuated by any passionate desire that all should enjoy the abundant life; what it has done it has not done from intention, but as an incident in the pursuit of pecuniary self-interest. Like other forms of social organisation it has evolved; it is not necessarily immutable and permanent. Like other institutions it also can be shaped and moulded to serve human purposes. One of the main problems for solution is how to control the vastly increased powers of wealth-production, so that by their exercise Man can build up a civilisation in which all will enjoy the fullest measure of freedom for self-realisation and self-expression.

IT was out of discussions respecting the perfectibility of human society that Malthus' "Essay on Population" grew. He combated the optimism prevailing towards the close of the eighteenth century by pointing out that the miseries resulting from the tendency of population to increase more rapidly than the means of subsistence would always prove a hindrance to the realisation of a happy society. Though between 1798 and 1816 his Treatise passed through six editions, in all of which various additions and corrections were introduced, it cannot be said that he made any solid contribution to our knowledge of this subject, nor is it easy to see clearly what practical proposals he based on his theoretical principles. Aspects of the problem of population in its relation to food supply had been discussed by several French and English writers before Malthus, and although he and his followers appear to have greatly exaggerated the magnitude and

the dangers to which they called attention, their work had value in emphasising the importance in all efforts at social amelioration of a scientific knowledge of the real factors which condition human life and happiness. It is not suggested that this was the moral drawn by his contemporaries. As a matter of fact, there cannot be any doubt that the reason for the ready acceptance of what has been called the Malthusian theory in certain of the circles of those days was the belief that it absolved the ruling classes of responsibility for the condition of the workers, whose misery was due not to any negligence on the part of their legislators nor to the institutions of the country, but alternatively to their own indiscretion or to the operation of immutable natural laws. Furthermore, the theory was constantly used as a bogey to discourage any attempts at bettering the economic conditions of the people on the ground that an increase in comfort would inevitably lead to an increase in numbers, making the last stage of things worse even than the first. Malthus wrote at a time when machine-industry was still in its infancy

and when the first concern of each nation was its own food problem; and the stress placed on the inadequacy of food supply as a check on the growth of population will find ready explanation in the conditions prevailing at the time. The abnormal sufferings of the people of England were due not to overpopulation, but to the joint effects of the war with Napoleon, which had plunged the nations of Europe into commercial hostilities, together with a shortage due to several years of bad harvests. But the sociological treatment of the question of population must found its conclusions on a more stable basis than the abnormal circumstances of any one country in an abnormal period in its history. It must relate it to the wider question of establishing the physical basis of society and link it up with the study of the interactions of man and the whole of his environment. The sociologist must have regard to all the factors affecting human fecundity as well as fertility, and view the problem not only from a standpoint of numbers, but also in its equally important qualitative or eugenic aspect.

In this chapter we shall take only the

quantitative aspect. It is undisputed that an essential condition of the well-being of the community is an adequate supply of the commodities necessary for the maintenance of a progressive standard of life, and that the aggregate population in a human community must bear relation to the total available supply of those necessary commodities. Now, if the supply of the materials of food and clothing had reached its utmost limit in a self-supporting community strictly limited to a definite area and from which migration would be impossible, to maintain the standard of life action would be bound to result, leading to the adjustment of numbers to the available means of subsistence. Action might be voluntary, taking the forms of infanticide, the killing of the old and sick, contraceptive measures or abortion, complete or partial abstention from intercourse, or involuntary, when a shortage of food would lead to disease and a high mortality.

Such in a degree are the conditions prevailing among many of the primitive races who have no capacity for providing themselves with food and clothing apart from

hunting and fishing, or whose knowledge of agriculture is rudimentary. Mr. Carr Saunders* cites evidence of abortion and infanticide among the Tasmanians and the Australian tribes, among the Eskimos and the American Indians of the North and Pacific coasts; the aged and sick are abandoned by the bushmen when moving away to a fresh hunting-ground. The Eskimos and certain of the Indians too, put their old people to death. He points out that these customs, by means of which numbers are kept to a desirable level, are not merely panic measures in times of scarcity, but are practised as normal features of social life. Abortion and infanticide arise from the difficulty of providing for more than one child at a time, the number of the children in the community being thereby kept at a fairly constant average figure. Further, behind these practices is the force of social pressure, the number of children to be preserved being the matter for consideration not only by the parents but also by the relations and the community in general. At one time, amongst the Fijians

* "The Population Problem," chaps. vii. and viii.

for example, as soon as a child was born the father had to live entirely in the men's house for the suckling period—a matter in Fiji of two or three years. In such a stage of development social conditions are more or less stationary. As skill in the production of necessities is small and its progress slow, therefore the desirable level of population will remain constant over a long period of time. Should any considerable improvement in the arts of production occur, it is obvious that the economic level would rise. Since Malthus wrote certain important factors have come into operation which have changed the whole aspect of the problem of population on its quantitative side for most of the civilised communities of the world. In the first place, there has been developed in each country a system of production involving the specialisation of individuals and their concentration upon definite tasks in which they excel, and, further, necessitating the exchange of products and services on a large scale. In England we no longer find the weavers of Halifax, the metal workers of West Bromwich, and the cutlers of Sheffield combining agri-

culture with manufacture as they did at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Specialisation and exchange have come to be looked upon as the mark of advancement in economic well-being, and the ideal of industrial organisation held before us is that of each individual devoting himself to the one task which he is best fitted to perform. All trading consists ultimately in the exchange of goods and services. From the primitive method of simple barter between near neighbours, trading has evolved until its mechanism is very complex and involves multitudes of processes and stages all subsidiary to the final end of enabling individuals to enjoy the use of commodities and services which would otherwise be impossible for them to obtain. Whilst one section of the community is engaged in the processes of producing—*i.e.*, altering the materials supplied by nature so as to increase their capacity for satisfying human wants—another large section of labour is devoted to the task of exchanging these products and conveying them to the persons who require their utilities. In its final analysis, trading is nothing more than a

device for ensuring the satisfaction of our wants or desires by enabling us to offer those who possess the means and are willing to part with them other modes of satisfying their desires. The bootmaker does nothing but help to make boots, the miner nothing but hew coal, but for their contribution to the production of boots or coal the mechanism of exchange enables them to obtain possession of a vast variety of commodities and the benefit of many kinds of services.

The other important factor affecting the level of population is the growth of international trade. International trade differs economically in no essential respect from home trade; it is simply an expansion of its operations over a larger area. As Dudley North stated in 1691: "For trade the whole world is but as one nation or people." Just as it is to the advantage of every person to concentrate on the form of economic activity which he is best equipped to undertake, so it is to the advantage of every country to specialise in the production of those commodities which its natural resources most highly favour. Not only is trade, however,

advantageous between countries with different natural products, but it also arises between countries which can severally produce the same commodities if one has a relative advantage for one kind and the other countries have like relative advantages in respect of other commodities. There is no space here to discuss in detail the application of the principle of comparative cost; it must suffice to state that it explains the benefit of individuals and nations expending their energy upon the occupations which are economically the most productive in the existing circumstances, and of purchasing with the products other desirable things in the best market wherever that may be. It is the principle of maximum efficiency. This makes it clear why with the growth of productive skill resulting in a fuller utilisation of natural sources, not only has a larger population become possible but necessary. It is not proposed to undertake here the necessarily intricate discussion on the laws of increasing and diminishing returns; it is enough to state that in industry as in agriculture the employment of increasing quantities of labour and

capital will, up to a certain point, yield a proportionate increase in return, and so, up to that point, the more labour there is available for the exploitation of the non-human instruments of production the better. "If we suppose all the difficulties about the measurements of returns to all industries taken together to be somehow overcome, we can see that at any given time, knowledge and circumstances remaining the same, just as there is a point of maximum return in each industry, so there must be in all industries taken together. If the population is not large enough to bring all the returns up to this point, returns will be less than they might be, and the remedy is increase of population." When the requisite population to reach this point in productivity has been attained, it is said to be at its optimum density. The conditions prevailing in this country, as in most of the countries of Europe, make the conception of what is a desirable level wholly different from that put forward by Malthus. To him the question was one of the relative increase of numbers and of food, with us it is one of the density of popu-

lation and the productiveness of industry. We can take the case of Britain as typical of the highly industrialised countries. It is well known that our soil does not, and cannot, feed or clothe us. Of the wheat consumed in the United Kingdom in the years 1910 to 1914, only 20 per cent. was home grown; of cheese, only 20 per cent.; of butter, including margarine, 25 per cent.; of meat of all kinds, 58 per cent.; while, as is well known, a multitude of commodities in daily use are not produced here at all.

Competent authorities have expressed doubt as to whether the most efficient exploitation of the agricultural resources of the country, with present standards of living, would provide sustenance for a population of more than 15 to 20 millions, and have affirmed that a population at the upper limit would involve food restriction in lean years, and perhaps in some cases partial starvation.* It must be remembered, too, that in a Britain compelled to be economically self-sufficing, the

* Dr. Brownlee, Director of the Statistics of British Medical Council in the *Manchester Guardian*, August 17, 1922.

population—to however low a limit it is restricted—would be bound to suffer serious hardship and discomfort from the loss of those commodities and conveniences for which we are and must ever be entirely dependent upon foreign sources. Yet the population of England and Wales, estimated in 1760 at about $6\frac{3}{4}$ millions, could rise to nearly 9 millions in 1801, to over 20 millions in 1861, to $37\frac{1}{2}$ millions in 1921, and be maintained at a constantly rising standard of comfort.

The statistics of occupation also provide evidence of how the working of the principle of comparative cost was transforming the country from a predominantly agricultural to a predominantly manufacturing community. Going back to 1688 and relying upon the calculation of Gregory King we find that $4\frac{1}{4}$ millions of the population of England and Wales were engaged in agriculture and only half a million employed in manufacture and commerce. Some eighty years later, Young estimated the agricultural classes to number $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions, which was practically half of the whole population. In 1831 over 31 per cent

of the male population of England and Wales were still engaged in agriculture. By 1851 the proportion declined to less than 24 per cent. In 1881 only 13·8 per cent. were thus engaged, while by 1901 the percentage had fallen to 9·5 per cent. In short, Britain was becoming more and more a gigantic factory with a population increasingly dependent for the prime necessities of life on the surplus produced by the rest of the world. It was because of her favourable position as the one great source of industrial power—cheap coal—that Britain became at one time the world's workshop. With it, as well as with the manufactures it made possible and the services involved in overseas trade, she obtained her corn from the plains of North America and Russia, mutton and wool from Australasia, beef from the Argentine, tea from India and China, coffee and sugar from the Indies, cotton from the United States, whilst many new sources of supplies have since been added. The crux of the whole problem of population on the quantitative side then lies in the principle of the economic unity of the world. It is neither profitable

nor practicable for a country to live unto itself in the economic sense. So far as Britain is concerned, we cannot dispense with overseas commerce; we cannot produce either the requisite food or the raw materials in sufficient quantities to sustain the life of our present population. Literally, we live by foreign trade, and this is equally true of most of the civilised countries of the world. The great majority of economists share the opinion of Mr. J. A. Hobson that "there is no evidence that the world's population is outrunning the natural resources; but on the contrary the presumption is that for their fuller utilisation a larger population is necessary and thereby could be maintained with a higher standard of living."* Though by now all this is familiar, its recognition finds very little reflection in the policies of nations. The immediate menace to the well-being of communities does not come from any impending exhaustion of the earth's resources, but from a collapse of the world's economic life. The hatreds, jealousies, and fears of the nations have expressed themselves in an

* Hobson, "The Declining Birth-rate," p. 75.

imbecile economic nationalism which is paralysing the whole system of exchange. Europe is Balkanising itself into bankruptcy.

The problem in those countries which have larger populations than they can possibly maintain with their own resources is, in its final analysis, the problem of how to bring back to the world in general and to the governments of Europe in particular a desire for peaceful co-operation based on a conviction that national antagonisms are insignificant compared with the great community of interest in which they ought to be lost and forgotten.

IN our earlier study of the evolution of society, we traced in the upward course of the common life of mankind an increasing control of Man over his environment. With growth of experience and reflection and by the application of reason to the phenomena which challenged him, he gradually reduced the chaos produced by a multitude of imagined personal forces into a scientifically ordered universe. His mastery over his physical circumstances became ever greater as he improved his tools and weapons; and as rational co-operation and a purposeful specialisation developed his organisation of society became more coherent and stable. In the previous chapter we saw how the economic process was gradually shaping itself throughout the centuries, to emerge ultimately in the capitalist system. The fact that the primary concern of most of us is to secure for ourselves the means of livelihood has

tended to make us forget that industry is only a part of human life, that it is not an end in itself, and that its function should be to subserve the higher purposes of existence. No political or industrial system exists by divine right. Its justification is purely utilitarian. To establish its claim for continued existence any economic organisation must first satisfy the test of whether it enables the whole community to feel secure in respect of those necessities demanded by a civilised and progressive standard of life; and secondly, that every individual's contribution to its operation should be such as to give him the fullest measure of happiness in the making thereof.

Of the first test it is not necessary to say much here. That the capitalist organisation of industry can produce sufficient commodities and conveniences to enable all to live and enjoy the comforts and amenities of civilised life cannot be doubted, yet it is patent that a large number of people are perpetually threatened by starvation. In primitive times when men were dependent for their food and clothing on the results of their own efforts in

the chase, a migration of animals would immediately result in the migration of the hunters, otherwise privation and death would speedily follow. Similarly, when life depended on agriculture a failure of the harvest would make unemployment and suffering inevitable. In the present organisation of indirect production we are all dependent for a livelihood on those who employ us; we are not, and most of us cannot become, our own masters. Whether or not we take a part in productive effort is not determined by us; we must first be hired to work by someone else before we can secure the means which will entitle us to a share in the products of industry and in order to satisfy our wants. When unemployment occurs it is not because the inhabitants of the world have more than enough of the things they could help to produce. Indeed, there is at the same time suffering because of their lack; but it does not pay the individuals who control their distribution to sell at the price those who need them can afford to pay. Men consequently are not allowed to continue making these much-needed commodities, and are thereby deprived

of the opportunity of entitling themselves and their families to the right of procuring the necessities of existence, which are probably at the same time stacked in warehouses and stock-rooms. It all seems very grotesque and tragic, and it is difficult to believe that Man, who has succeeded in establishing such a mastery over the forces of nature and in extracting from the soil ample supplies of the things he needs, cannot devise a system whereby their distribution can be effected so as to ensure to all who perform useful social service the primary conditions of civilised life.

In dealing with the second criterion, we are discussing a matter over which controversy is less sharp. There is at least common agreement that in an organisation of which specialisation and division of labour are the leading characteristics, individuals should perform the tasks for which they are physically and mentally best fitted. Not only is this a condition of productive efficiency, but it is of first importance to human mental and moral well-being that men and women should find happiness in their daily work.

The extent to which vocational misfitting prevails is revealed by a growing body of statistical evidence relating to labour turnover—*i.e.*, the rate of change in the working staff in particular industries. In twelve large factories in the United States, in order to increase the number of workers by 6,700 it was necessary to engage no less than 42,600 persons.* In the Ford Works, although there were never more than 10,000 workpeople in employment at any one time, 50,000 people were taken on in twelve months.† Investigations made by Mr. Joseph A. Willits‡ showed that in a particular shop in a carpet mill, between 1907-15, 4 per cent. only of the male employees engaged during the period remained in the same employment over five years; 3 per cent. more than four but less than five years; 4 per cent. two to three years; 9 per cent. one to two years; and 75 per cent. less than one year. Forty-eight per cent. of men and 37 per cent. of

* Lee, "The Human Machine and Industrial Efficiency."

† Marot, "The Creative Impulse in Industry."

‡ Willits, "Steadying Employment."

women remained less than ten weeks. During the war the Industrial Fatigue Research Board of the Ministry of Munitions collected a big array of facts, though in their interpretation it is important to remember that the conditions were abnormal in that people were either not free agents in the choice of their tasks, or where they did choose freely, a considerable number, particularly women, entered industry for the first time from a variety of motives other than those of economic necessity. In its report* the Board gives facts relating to a number of factories. In the case of one, a London fuse factory, it was found to have the huge turnover involved by changing a volume equal to its average staff every five months; another accomplished a similar turnover every six months; a projectile factory changed its volume every thirteen months. In two other cases cited the achievement of this result took fourteen and a half and nine and a half months respectively. Mr. Graham Wallas records in "The Great Society" the results of his investigations in the direction of ascer-

* General Series, No. 4.

taining the attitude of workmen to their work, and shows how little happiness they find in it, the agricultural labourer being the only person who was very emphatic with regard to the pleasure to be obtained from his work. The economic loss and the mental and moral harm which accrue from the filling of round holes with square pegs is inestimable, and the utilisation of the recently developed psychological technique for the study of individual gifts and aptitude, and the provision for all classes of the community with skilled guidance in the choice of employment followed by a system of training and apprenticeship are to-day a vital necessity. With regard to vocational guidance, the position in this country is highly unsatisfactory. True, the Education (Choice of Employment) Act passed in 1910 gave to local authorities powers, subject to the approval of the Board of Education, to make arrangements for "giving to boys and girls under seventeen years of age assistance with respect to the choice of suitable employment, by means of the collection and the communication of information, and the furnishing of advice,"

while in most towns of over 25,000 inhabitants a Juvenile Employment Committee of the Ministry of Labour exists. But though much useful work has been and is being done in securing employment, it is doubtful whether any really scientific investigation is undertaken to ascertain the child's mental aptitude. And, apart from the steady growth of new vocational openings such as transport work, requiring little preparatory training, the old system of indentured apprenticeship is more or less obsolete, for machinery has largely superseded handicraft and created a demand for machine-minders rather than craftsmen, with the result that it is no longer easy to draw a distinct line of demarcation between skilled and unskilled trades. A great feature of modern industrialism is the sub-division into several trades of what was formerly a trade in itself. Engineering, for example, is now sub-divided into fitting, turning, moulding, pattern-making, millwrighting, erecting, etc., and a boy able to secure entry into apprenticeship in engineering has to decide as to which branch he is desirous of taking up. He learns this branch and no others.

There are, moreover, in each of these subdivisions more detailed processes which are gradually becoming stereotyped as trades in themselves. The sub-divisions are becoming more sub-divided, and each further subdivision becomes more automatic in its processes. Therefore, the boy who comes on to one of these machines tends to swell the ranks of the semi-skilled. To these mere processes apprenticeship is not possible, for there is little to acquire save what can be mastered in a few hours. In the cabinet-making industry, again, an employer will now confine himself to cabinet or bedroom suites, or cupboards, or even to one or two patterns of these. Thus he is only in a position to teach, and the boy to learn, a part of the business, and how much this will be depends on the character of the article produced. Apprenticeship still exists in those trades which are not capable of division into separate specialisms, such as plumbing, and therefore a knowledge of the whole business has to be acquired, but on the whole the system of apprenticeship is rapidly declining. To mention "Industrial Training" to any trade

union leader—particularly in the engineering trade—almost invariably evokes the query, “Do you mean Taylorism?” One senses hostility immediately, and the reason is obvious. F. W. Taylor (1856-1915)* was an engineer managing works in Pennsylvania who set out to organise human labour so as to ensure maximum production. To attain this object he proceeded along two lines. First, it was necessary to develop a highly perfected plant or equipment which should embody the form, dimensions, weight, and the quality calculated to result in a maximum speed. It was then necessary to form a staff adapted to this technique and these conditions of speed—a staff of which each member was really in his right place whether he gave orders or obeyed them; and it was necessary to train this staff. This was not easy. Instructions relating to the preparation and execution of work were given in writing on “instruction cards,” and the workers were taught to interpret them without hesitation.

* “The Principles of Scientific Management,” F. W. Taylor; “Shop Management,” F. W. Taylor, 1911 edition.

Moreover, they were shown what movements were required in the use of a given tool or in a given process, and what movements should be dispensed with, for, being unnecessary, they were profitless. Those movements which were useful should be performed in a minimum time, and other movements should be avoided. To satisfy this "law of economy" Taylor had to time the different actions and movements, retaining only those whose efficacy was beyond doubt. He made an empirical selection of workmen for the lifting and carrying of pig-iron. No strength or endurance tests were given, but a certain standard of work was set as a day's "task," and only those men who could attain it were employed on the work. When Taylor began to reorganise it only one in eight was found physically capable of the set task ("Principles," p. 61). As the joint result of reorganisation of the work based upon time and motion studies and of selection of workmen each individual finally handled about forty-eight tons of pig-iron per day as against the twelve or thirteen tons formerly dealt with. That mere physical strength was not the sole

requirement for the work may be inferred from the fact that one of the men who made the daily task for a period of several years was a small man who weighed about 130 pounds ("Shop Management," p. 50, 1911 edition). Taylor also stressed mental characteristics: "One of the first requirements for a man who is fit to handle pig-iron as a regular occupation is that he shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he more nearly resembles the ox in his mental make-up than any other type" ("Principles," p. 59).

It is not necessary here to discuss the value of Taylor's contribution to the problem of vocational guidance and scientific training; his work is mentioned to indicate how remote is his point of view from that which commends itself to reformers in this country to-day and the standpoint from which the subject is approached by the scientific sociologist. It also explains the hostility of trade unionism. The spirit which permeates "Taylorism" is definitely antagonistic to those forces bent on humanising employment conditions. It has no concern for the mental and moral reactions of industrial life. First

in its scale of values comes production, while human personality and fullness of life would appear very low down. The tendency toward rendering common industry cultural and spiritualising finds no support in "Taylorism." As to what is to happen to the non-bovine, those who do not enjoy the blissful state of being "stupid and phlegmatic," Taylor finds solace in the belief that "there is at present such a demand for labour that no working man is forced to be idle for more than a day or two; so that the less capable workers are not more unfortunate than before. Instead of pitying them we ought, on the contrary, to congratulate ourselves, and rejoice that a great number of valuable workers have at least the chance of earning high wages" ("Principles," 1911). But to be an advocate of industrial training and to believe in industrial efficiency does not necessarily imply a mechanical theory of human labour. Industrial efficiency is a condition of general social well-being, and its achievement does not necessitate a dehumanisation of conditions of labour with a resultant personal demoralisation of those employed. One perceives in

the attitude of some of the "cultural" educationists a certain amount of impatience with and contempt for technical instruction. This is quite unwarranted. Once a boy leaves school and goes to work, work becomes at once the dominant influence on his whole life. It outweighs the influences of his leisure, of home, church, or club. It is the one compulsory influence which survives the passing of the compulsion of school. His physical, mental and moral life is brought, for better or for worse, under pressure of his daily work. When his body, mind, and character are most plastic they are formed or deformed by the labour which he performs. What his labour makes him, that to a great extent he is in his leisure. That he should be happy in his work because he has been guided into the right vocation for which his psycho-physical qualities best fit him, and that the conditions of his employment are such that he can carry through his duties with a minimum of strain and fatigue, would seem to be two of the prerequisites of susceptibility to cultural influences during leisure. Further, to look upon productive labour as

a necessary evil which should be limited to as small a compass of time and effort as possible, so that the leisure hours might be utilised for the accumulation of knowledge and the building up of character, while intelligible as a protest against the Industrialism which knows nothing of moral values, denotes a lack of the sense of realities. Apart from the fact that the population of Great Britain is such that it cannot be supported without producing for export and that a certain minimum of output is necessary to enable all to subsist, most men and also most women—at any rate in the temperate zone—cannot be consistently idle and remain happy. Purposeful activity is as natural to a human being as playing is to a pup, and it is also obvious that men vary in their predilections and capacities. Specialisation and the division of labour are not the discoveries of the eighteenth century. At a very early period we find a recognition that some have one gift and some another, and that it is to the advantage of society to let each use his own gift in the public service. And if we analyse our own experience we know that it is in

the performance of the task for which we are best fitted that happiness lies.

Aristotle defined happiness as "an activity of the soul in the direction of excellence in an unhampered life"; that is, in doing one's duty and doing it well. There are few of us who have not at some time or other experienced the joy of purposeful labour. In endeavouring to guide human beings and equipping them for those vocations to which they can give their best work and in which therefore they can find the truest happiness, we are only carrying out the Platonic principle of training every citizen to fill the one position where he can lead the best life for the good of the community. We have too long looked upon our daily occupation as something lying outside the sphere of social service, but while industry remains the basis of civilisation, the pursuit of excellence in work must be its truest form of expression.

*Chapter IX The Political Organisation of
Society*

NOT the least important branch of Sociology is the study of Man's effort to organise the government of his community, and in order to secure an adequate conception of the political organisation of society it is necessary to be clear as to the origin, nature, and functions of the State. Most of the long controversies concerning the abstract nature of sovereignty have been prompted by a desire to secure a speculative basis for political changes, proposed or accomplished. In the sixteenth century when half of Europe withdrew itself from the sway of the Pope and the authority of the Church was shaken, when the disintegration of the feudal structure of society had increased the power of the Crown in many countries and a new sceptical spirit of enquiry had sprung up in Western and Southern Europe, men began to ask what was the basis of a Sovereign's claim to be obeyed. While

kings were everywhere assuming new functions and extending their control over the affairs of their kingdoms, many of their subjects were enquiring what the limitations and the powers of a monarch were, and tried to satisfy themselves whether the transgression of these limitations and the powers of a monarch would justify a rebellion against him. The old theory which conceived the rights of a monarch as the grant of divine authority was played out. The view propounded by Filmer, who traced the absolution of kings to a grant made by God to Adam of complete power, even that of life and death, over his descendants, through the patriarchs whose *patria potestas*, together with the divine sanction which accompanied it, had been inherited in full by the kings, received very short shrift in England in the Revolution of 1688. The Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement were such that no one afterwards could claim that William and Mary or their successors ruled by divine choice. To John Locke fell the task of finding for the Revolution a theoretical justification. To explain the origin of the Civil State, he postulates

the existence of an antecedent state of nature, which, though it was not one of universal war, was inconvenient and unsatisfactory enough, for there was a "want of an established, settled, known law, 'the law of nature' being obscured since men are biassed in their interest as well as ignorant for want of study of it."

This "law of nature" is the body of rules, dictated by reason, which universally governs the conduct of men. Under the conditions prior to the establishment of the State, there is no "known and indifferent judge" to enforce this law of nature, so it is left to each individual to give to it the best interpretation he can. Hence arises a variety of ideas in the conceptions of justice, with the resultant uncertainty and chaos driving men to a realisation of the advantages of submitting to the restraint of civil society in order to preserve for themselves those fundamental rights ordained by nature—Life, Liberty, and Property. Locke was not the first to posit the existence of a state of nature anterior to civil society and out of which the latter emerged. Before Locke's exposition came

that of Thomas Hobbes, who addressed his theory to the circumstances of the Civil War. To him the state of nature was a condition where there was no place for industry, "no culture of the earth, no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported. . . . No arts, no letters, no Society . . . continual fear and danger of violent death and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." Out of such conditions, reason impelled men to find a way of escape, that way being the setting up in their midst of a common power "to keep them in awe," which should be endowed with strength sufficient to enable him to keep peace within and repel foes without. Hobbes makes it clear that the contract is in no sense one between the Sovereign who takes up the rights, and each or all of those who transfer them, but between man and man of these only. This aggregate of consenting people united under one sovereign power becomes a Body Politic, or Commonwealth, or State. It is "that great Leviathan . . . to which we owe under the immortal God our Peace and Defence."

In Rousseau's view, the surrender of the individual rights enjoyed in a somewhat idyllic "simple savage" state of nature was made not to a Sovereign but to the whole society. It is a contract "whereby each and every individual agrees with every other to forgo his natural freedom by constituting a State, which is to act for all and in which the citizen recovers his freedom because he is himself a part of the general will." Whoever refuses to obey the general will is to be compelled by the whole body to obey it: "he will be compelled to be free." Every member is called both a citizen and a subject; a citizen, as one having a share in the Sovereignty; a subject, as one owing obedience to the laws made by the State. Rousseau sought to establish the Sovereignty of the people and the supremacy of the general will. The legislator is not the Sovereign, for he is but the organ and servant of the sovereign community. It will be remembered that it was this political philosophy of Rousseau which largely inspired the Declaration of the Rights of Man in the early stages of the French Revolution, and later its influence

is manifest in the terms of the American Declaration of Independence.

In an earlier chapter we endeavoured to show how small a part reason and deliberate action by the whole community played in the development of institutions, and there is therefore no need to discuss here the idea of an original contract from the historical standpoint. But though the explanation of the origin of the State by reference to a contract either among the individual members themselves or between these as a body and the Sovereign who rules them has no historical foundation, still there are features of an advanced civil society which give plausibility to a theory of the contractual nature of political relationships. We find ourselves in a community which imposes upon us all manner of restrictions, most of which we willingly accept, and at the same time in virtue of this acceptance we enjoy certain rights and privileges which we know we should not enjoy in the absence of a common authority exercising itself in the maintenance of order and law. Every business contract implies an agreement between responsible

individuals to restrict voluntarily their liberty by entering into mutual obligations, each receiving in return a corresponding right or privilege and, at a first glance, this appears to be the character of the relation between the citizen and the State. Duties of various kinds are laid upon him. He has to pay taxes, obey a multitude of laws, regulations, and rules, and in other ways restrict his freedom of action, while at the same time he does not lose his individuality, but rather gains a larger scope for its exercise. He knows that by obeying laws relating to sanitation he is ensuring the conditions of good health; by paying his taxes he secures the performance of services vital to his own and to the well-being of the community; and, again, he knows that he can always invoke the power of the State for the enforcement of certain of his rights, such as protection for his person and property. But however plausible is the effort to explain the State as a contract and to base political obedience on a rational perception of the advantages which accrue from a strong and stable government, it does not cover all the

facts. It suffers from the same defect as the theory of Bentham and his followers, which accounts for men's obedience to civil authority by their fear of the physical harm which follows on disobedience. They both err not in pointing to a wholly false cause, but in extending the efficiency of a true cause far beyond its real scope. As we have already seen, the investigations of Social Psychology give little encouragement for the belief that subjects in obeying laws are always conscious of clear rational motives. Political obedience is not a thing by itself, but a form of what may be called social compliance in general, and is a manifestation of a complex of human tendencies in which several elements are discernible. We can see at work those characteristics of gregariousness which have already been described—namely, unreasoning acceptance of herd opinion; the readiness to comply with the will of any group or party to which one is attached and to believe unquestioningly what comes from any source deemed authoritative; the terror of any life apart from the herd which expresses itself in a disposition to do what

everybody else does to follow the line of least resistance; and also in the willingness to follow a leader. But though human conduct rests on inherited impulses we cannot explain social compliance nor, of course, its special form, political obedience, entirely in terms of any one or any number of these instincts. In the changing forms of organisation through which society has evolved, different channels have been provided for their manifestation. A social tradition has been built up, Man has learnt much by the exercise of intelligence and through experience, and inherited impulses have consequently been transformed. What is important to remember is that it is infinitely easier for us to conform to the rules of the community than to act against them. We have an instinctive bias towards obedience and away from disobedience. Reason, too, has a place in determining men's actions in society though its potency as a factor is less than we would fain believe. Oftener than not it is exercised merely to explain and excuse our instinctive and irrational acts after they have been accomplished or when

we are firmly set on accomplishing them. Still, with a more widespread interest in political affairs, it is clear that reflection and conscious purpose are bound to play a larger part in influencing men's attitude to governments and legislative proposals than hitherto. To most of us, fear of punishment for disobedience is seldom a conscious motive. Yet it is ever there in the background in the form of an instinctive shrinking from losing the good opinion of our fellows. Except to certain criminal elements in the community, the dread of physical pain has little potency; to normal individuals social ostracism is the punishment most dreaded. Political obedience then does not lend itself to so simple an explanatory formula as that of the contract theorists or that of the Benthamites.

The fundamental error in the theory, however, lies in a false antithesis between the rights of the individual and the powers of the State. Rights are conceived of as a fixed quantity shared between the members of a community and their Government, and the portion enjoyed by one cannot be increased without an equal diminution in the

portion of the other. The error arises from the use of a static category, and is one by no means confined to the formal exponents of the social contract. It is a conception which underlies much of the opposition to State action in regulating the various activities of men. Every piece of legislative interference is viewed as a filching from us of those "natural rights" with which we were endowed when we sprang into being. It should not be a difficult task to show that Man has no rights before and apart from his becoming a member of civil society. But first, what is a right? If we examine any one of the rights we possess, we shall see at once that it has two aspects. If a man has right to the privacy of his home, this means that others must refrain from forcing themselves into it. If he has a right to walk down a street, it means that no one can obstruct him. The recognition of a right is also a recognition of an obligation by another in respect of it. A right is one side of a moral or legal relation; it is the relation viewed from the standpoint of the individual to whom a due is owed; the same relation

looked at from the point of view of those owing the due is a duty. Hence there is no sense in the proposition that prior to the existence of government, Man, as Rousseau puts it, has "an unlimited right to anything that tempts him." The right of one to live and the other to kill cannot both be recognised at the same time. Social liberty cannot exist without social restraint, for if it is to be shared alike by all members of the community there must be restrictions enforced on all, otherwise freedom for some will involve oppression for others. Our freedom of action, therefore, must be curtailed if each and every individual is to enjoy an equal measure of liberty. The most we can hope for as members of society is to be free in our actions in so far as they do not interfere with the like freedom of others. "Liberty," as the Declaration of 1789 defined it, "consists in the power to do everything that does not injure another." Viewed thus, it is clear that the basic condition of its enjoyment by all is the existence of a common authority exercising coercive power.

The claim of the sweated to a living wage,

of the factory workers to tolerable conditions of labour, of miners to protective measures for their personal safety, of children to education, of wives to maintenance, have all become legal rights through Government action restricting the freedom of employers, parents, and husbands. In the legal sense, a claim cannot become a right until it receives the sanction of and is enforced by the State, whose function it is to secure and maintain the conditions of social welfare, thereby bringing liberty into being for all its citizens. The chief difficulty in gaining general acceptance for this conception of the function of the State is the fact that like most other social institutions it is the product of evolution. The ordering of the life of the community has not always been in accordance with the desires of its members. Legislative and executive authority have only within recent times in Western Europe theoretically rested on the expressed will of the general body of citizens. The power of issuing commands and demanding obedience has been in the course of social development variously grounded. At one time its basis was an

alleged capacity to interpret the minds of the ancestral ghosts, at another conquest and subjugation; still later it lay in feudal right and, up to recent years in England, the ruling classes were those who owned property. In all these stages the State corresponded broadly to a group of men exercising a coercive authority over and standing outside the community, a separate entity, or a Leviathan as Hobbes called it, having an existence apart, shaping and directing the lives of its subjects irrespective of their desires and aspirations. Most things that have evolved carry with them vestiges of the earlier forms through which they have passed, and this is true of the modern State. Despite the democratic theory that the State is the community organized for making its common will effectual by political means, that "it is the organised political personality of a sovereign people," the State in the exercise of its almost limitless powers still carries with it the taint of its past. Often in the most enlightened countries it carries its authority far beyond the limit necessary for the establishment of the conditions of social welfare. Its power

is asserted at times in a way inimical to the best interests of its citizens. Still, once it is realised that the State is an instrument of society, an instrument that can be used to achieve whatever ends its members care to pursue, the importance of a civic sense and of an efficient democratic practice becomes evident. Democracy is a method whereby society becomes identified with its organ of government; it is the process in which the subjects of the State become members of it. It is true to say of this the greatest, as it is of every other social or political institution, that it is not an end in itself. It is an organ of social life, good or bad according to the spirit which it embodies and the purpose it is made to serve.

THERE are few phrases that so frequently fall from our lips as "Social Progress," and there is no phrase as to the precise significance of which we are so hazy. Progress is a word with a long history, and since it involves a criterion of value, its meaning has changed with the ever-changing standards of judgment. Before we submit a final verdict on any phase of social development we must be clear as to the tests we should apply. We are prone to assume certain values to be absolute and complete which are really relative and partial. The experiences of the war, for example, weakened considerably the tendency to identify Progress with the advance of Science, for it was seen that though Science could release us from the thralldom of superstition and provide mankind with the means of realising all kinds of purposes, her services could be requisitioned with equal facility for ignoble as for noble ends. Her gifts can damn as well as bless; it all depends

on those who use them. Physical and intellectual energies can be bent to the service of destruction, works and monuments of creative genius laid low, and resources accumulated by generations of patient toil wasted when human beings are swayed by passions which defile and imbrute their natures. When History sits in judgment on our civilisation and each nation is called upon to render its account, the test of its greatness will not be the size of its population, the extent of its territory, the amount of its wealth, the victories of its armed forces, but the quality of the men and women whom it produced.

To grasp firmly this truth is the most urgent need of to-day. There was never a time in the history of Britain when so many people were deeply concerned with political issues. This is all to the good provided it is also realised that political activity is not an end in itself any more than the State is. We are not relieved of all social responsibility when we have recorded our votes. The business of politics is securing the conditions necessary for the highest and fullest expression of individual life, but when these conditions

have been realised, there will still remain for every individual the task of living it out. Self-knowledge and self-culture are as much a social obligation as is membership of a trade union or the payment of our rates.

Political and economic institutions though possessing great potency are not the only operative factors in environment. The products of the thinking of untold generations and the lessons of their experiences are also stored up in language, books, customs, habits, tools and so on, and are transmitted from generation to generation, moulding action, guiding behaviour, giving continuity to social development and placing at the disposal of future ages the achievements of the past. In the spheres of knowledge and industry each generation can build on the work of its predecessors because it inherits scientific conclusions most of which need not be thought out again and devices that have not to be invented afresh. Here the enrichment of the heritage can be rapid and sure. In the realm of morals it is different. Though we inherit a tradition which prescribes rules of conduct which are for the most part accepted without question-

ing and applied without reflection, we know that in every age progress in religion and ethics has come through those men and women regarded by the herd as bad or mad, but whose strength of conviction was such as to make them willing to suffer exile, torture, or death in their effort to overthrow the accepted beliefs of the community into which they were born. In morals the universality of a dogma is no proof of its validity. "Each man's character has to be formed anew, and though teaching goes for much, it is not everything. The individual in the end works out his own salvation." The moral ideas which drive are not those inculcated from without, but those which spring spontaneously from a deep spiritual life, and this every man must live by himself.

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